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CAUSE LAWYERS INSIDE THE STATE 
Douglas NeJaime* 
 
Scholarship on the legal profession tends to situate cause lawyers in a 
state of adversarial tension with government lawyers.  In this traditional 
paradigm, cause lawyers challenge the agenda of government attorneys, 
who represent institutional interests and the status quo.  From this 
oppositional perspective, socio-legal scholars explore the activity of 
lawyers working at public interest law firms, for general social movement 
organizations, and in private practice.  For some time, however, cause 
lawyers have moved in and out of government, thus complicating the 
conventional picture of lawyer-state opposition.  This Article aims to 
identify and understand the significant role that cause lawyers play inside 
the state.  It does so by drawing on recent social movement scholarship 
exploring the overlapping and interdependent relationship between 
movements and the state.  Ultimately, this Article identifies four key impacts 
that cause lawyers within the state may produce:  (1) reforming the state 
itself; (2) shaping state personnel and priorities; (3) harnessing state power 
to advance shared movement-state goals; and (4) facilitating and mediating 
relationships between the movement and the state.  These productive 
functions, however, also come with significant limitations.  By appealing to 
governmental authority and involving the state as a pro-movement force, 
cause lawyers in government positions may channel movement activity 
toward moderate goals and into institutional, state-centered tactics.  
Accordingly, this Article explores not only the benefits but also the costs of 
cause lawyer movement in and out of the state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the National Law Journal found that 60 out of 118 lawyers hired 
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division over the previous 
two years had worked for a civil rights organization1—including twenty-
four for the ACLU, fifteen for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law, and ten for the NAACP or the NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund (LDF).2  Also in 2011, The New York Times reported that 
approximately 90 percent of lawyers recently hired across three sections of 
the Civil Rights Division had civil rights backgrounds.3  In other words, 
 
 1. See David Ingram, Civil Rights Staffs Up, NAT’L L.J., May 30, 2011, at 11. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Charlie Savage, In Shift, Justice Dept. Hiring Lawyers with Civil Rights 
Backgrounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at A19.  While federal law prohibits the use of 
political or ideological considerations in hiring career attorneys to the DOJ, see 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 2301–2305 (2006), the 2008 Inspector General’s report found that during the Bush 
Administration the DOJ’s Bradley Schlozman used conservative political affiliations to 
screen candidates for positions in the Civil Rights Division.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, 
AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER 
PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 4–6 (July 2, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL’S 
REPORT].  Of course, there is a correlation between political affiliation and service at a 
traditional civil rights organization.  As The New York Times reported on its specific sample, 
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those with significant cause lawyering experience were entering (or 
reentering) government service during the Obama Administration.4  While 
the lawyers’ civil rights credentials qualified them for their government 
positions, they also signaled the likelihood of increased action on issues 
important to the organizations from which these lawyers came.  Indeed, a 
former DOJ Bush appointee, who himself had joined a conservative 
movement organization after his government service, worried that attorneys 
in the Obama Administration would coordinate efforts with their former 
employers.5  Therefore, even as cause lawyering experience furnished 
relevant expertise, it suggested relationships between activist networks and 
the government that fueled partisan criticism.6 
Cause lawyering credentials appear especially important for political 
appointees to top-level enforcement positions.  For instance, Professor 
Samuel Bagenstos, a leading disability rights advocate and scholar, served 
as the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the DOJ from 2009 to 
2011.7  Bagenstos had worked on significant disability rights cases, 
including United States v. Georgia.8  Another accomplished disability 
 
while nearly 25 percent of the Bush hires had listed conservative affiliations, such as 
Federalist Society membership, on their resumes, none of the Obama hires did. See Savage, 
supra note 3.  And more than 60 percent of the Obama hires listed liberal credentials. See id. 
 4. See Savage, supra note 3 (several of the DOJ hires during the Obama Administration 
had left the DOJ during the Bush Administration).  In the seminal first volume of their cause 
lawyering series, Professors Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold explained that cause 
lawyering “is frequently directed at altering some aspect of the social, economic, and 
political status quo.” Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the 
Reproduction of Professional Authority:  An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING:  POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3, 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold 
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering]; see also Austin Sarat & 
Stuart A. Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and the Possibilities of Cause 
Lawyering:  An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 3, 13 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, State 
Transformation] (“The objective of the attorneys that we characterize as cause lawyers is to 
deploy their legal skills to challenge prevailing distributions of political, social, economic, 
and/or legal values and resources.” (citing Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 
4)). 
 5. See Ingram, supra note 1 (reporting remarks by Hans von Spakovsky, who worked 
at the Heritage Foundation after his time at the DOJ). 
 6. For instance, Ed Whelan attacked two openly gay DOJ attorneys with cause 
lawyering experience by suggesting they were part of “a broader ideological agenda that 
would have gay causes trump religious liberty.” Ed Whelan, Re:  Obama DOJ Picks a Fight 
Against Religious Freedom, NAT’L REV. ONLINE:  BENCH MEMOS (Aug. 29, 2011, 1:01 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/275777. 
 7. See Samuel Bagenstos, MICH. LAW, http://web.law.umich.edu/_facultybiopage/
facultybiopagenew.asp?ID=411 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“From 2009–2011, he was a 
political appointee in the U.S. Department of Justice, where he served as the Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, the number-two official in the Civil 
Rights Division.”). 
 8. 546 U.S. 151 (2006).  Disability rights scholars linked Bagenstos’s appointment to 
the potential for more vigorous civil rights enforcement by the DOJ. See Michael Ashley 
Stein, Michael E. Waterstone, & David B. Wilkins, Cause Lawyering for People with 
Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1697 (2010) (reviewing SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW 
AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009)). 
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rights advocate, Eve Hill, serves as Senior Counselor to the Assistant 
Attorney General.9  Hill had been Executive Director of the Disability 
Rights Legal Center and handled disability rights work at the Burton Blatt 
Institute.10  These appointees’ cause lawyering credentials constituted 
qualifications for their government positions.  In fact, when President 
Obama announced his selection of Jacqueline Berrien, who had spent 
several years at LDF,11 to head the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), he drew attention to Berrien’s cause lawyering work, 
explaining that she “has spent her entire career fighting to give voice to 
underrepresented communities and protect our most basic rights.”12  Indeed, 
Berrien’s EEOC biography recounts her years at LDF, the Lawyers’ 
Committee, and the ACLU.13 
Yet, by suggesting social movement affiliations and loyalties, political 
appointees’ cause lawyering credentials also animate partisan attacks.  
When President Obama appointed Professor Chai Feldblum to the EEOC, 
he touted her cause lawyering experience, including her work as legislative 
counsel for the ACLU’s HIV/AIDS Project and her role in drafting the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).14  And the LGBT press 
praised Feldblum’s appointment by noting her legal work for the LGBT 
community.15  Feldblum’s accomplishments, however, made her a target 
for social conservatives.16  The Traditional Values Coalition (TVC) 
 
 9. See Statement of Eve Hill Before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor 
& Pensions, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Hill2.pdf. 
 10. See Eve L. Hill, BURTON BLATT INST., SYRACUSE UNIV., http://bbi.syr.edu/
publications/staffcvs/EHill_CV.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 11. See Jacqueline A. Berrien, Chair, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/berrien.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Obama Labor Pick’s Support for Gay Rights Worries Conservatives, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/03/31/obamas-
pick-join-eeoc-blasted-conservative-groups/.  Feldblum’s EEOC biography stresses her work 
to advance both disability and LGBT rights. See Chai Feldblum, Commissioner, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/feldblum.cfm (last visited Oct. 
20, 2012). 
 15. See Lisa Keen, Senate Confirms Feldblum to EEOC Seat, WINDY CITY TIMES (Dec. 
29, 2011), http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/gay/lesbian/news/ARTICLE.php?AID=
29957 (“She is best known to the LGBT community as a key counsel on the drafting and 
negotiations over [ENDA] [and] . . . as legislative counsel for the [ACLU] in Washington, 
D.C.”). 
 16. Similarly, Professor Craig Becker, a labor law attorney and law professor, recently 
served on the National Labor Relations Board. See Craig Becker, Biography, GEO. LAW, 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/becker-craig.cfm# (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  He 
had served as Associate General Counsel to two major unions. See id.  His nomination was 
met with intense opposition by conservatives. See Carl Hulse, Republicans Block 
Confirmation of Labor Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES:  CAUCUS (Feb. 9, 2010, 5:22 PM), http://
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/republicans-block-confirmation-of-labor-lawyer/.  
Becker served pursuant to a recess appointment before the Administration ultimately 
withdrew his nomination. See Byron Tau, Obama Withdraws Labor Lawyer’s Nomination, 
POLITICO (Dec. 15, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.politico.com/politico44/2011/12/obama-
withdraws-labor-lawyers-nomination-107671.html.  Professor Lani Guinier, a former LDF 
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connected her cause lawyering work to its objection to her government 
appointment.  “Instead of being an unbiased referee on the EEOC,” TVC 
declared, Feldblum “would be a radical activist who would use the force of 
government to implement aggressive and intrusive employment non-
discrimination laws to benefit the LGBT political agenda.”17 
As these examples illustrate, both social movement activists and 
government officials acknowledge that cause lawyers enter the state.  Those 
on both the right and left recognize the opportunities offered when lawyers 
who have worked for a particular movement are elevated to government 
positions.  And those inside the state see previous cause lawyering 
experience as a marker of relevant expertise. 
Yet socio-legal scholars generally have not devoted sustained attention to 
either the movement of cause lawyers into the state or the impact of these 
lawyers once in government positions.18  Instead, scholarship on the legal 
profession tends to situate cause lawyers in a state of adversarial tension 
with government lawyers, including criminal prosecutors and civil attorneys 
representing state and federal agencies.  In this traditional paradigm, cause 
lawyers challenge the agenda of government lawyers, who represent 
institutional interests and the status quo.  From this oppositional 
perspective, socio-legal scholars explore the activity of lawyers working at 
public interest law firms, for general social movement organizations, and in 
private practice.  For some time, however, cause lawyers have moved in 
and out of government, thus complicating the conventional picture of 
lawyer-state opposition.19  This Article aims to expose and begin to 
understand the significant role that cause lawyers play in social movement 
activity from inside the state.20 
 
lawyer, has written about her appointment to be Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.  
When President Clinton nominated Guinier, conservative activists attacked her by 
mischaracterizing her views.  Ultimately, Clinton withdrew her nomination in an episode 
that revealed the politicized (and impoverished) discourse that may surround cause lawyer 
movement into the state. See LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE:  TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS 
SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 37, 126–27 (1998). 
 17. Lesbian Activist Chai Feldblum Confirmed for EEOC:  US Senate’s Lame-Duck Gift 
to the Homosexual Movement, MASSRESISTANCE (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.mass
resistance.org/docs/gen/10d/brown_dadt/feldblum.html (quoting TVC posting). 
 18. Notable exceptions emerge from research on the conservative legal movement. See 
infra Part I.C.2. 
 19. The National Law Journal reported that fourteen lawyers who had left (or been 
pushed out of) the DOJ during the Bush Administration returned to the DOJ during the 
Obama Administration, and many of them had worked at public interest organizations in the 
interim. See Ingram, supra note 1. 
 20. The definition of “cause lawyer” is contested.  In this Article, I take a relatively 
broad view, including lawyers beyond those who have done cause lawyering work at public 
interest organizations. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of 
Public Interest Practice:  1975–2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1602–03 (2006) (explaining 
that their study of public interest law organizations “is not a study of public interest practice 
or ‘cause lawyering’ in general because such a study might also include, among other things, 
pro bono work by attorneys in private practice and other, non-traditional forms of law 
practice”).  Indeed, the very basis of my analysis assumes that some cause lawyering work 
may occur in government settings.  Furthermore, for the government lawyers I identify, I 
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By attending to the relationship between cause lawyers and state power, 
this Article identifies four key impacts that cause lawyers within the state 
may produce:  (1) reforming the state itself; (2) shaping state personnel and 
priorities; (3) harnessing state power to advance shared movement-state 
goals; and (4) facilitating and mediating relationships between the 
movement and the state.  By drawing on state power, cause lawyers in 
government positions may make the state a more favorable context in which 
to pursue movement goals and may shape the state into a more positive 
force in movement activity.  Bound up in these productive functions, 
however, are significant limitations and constraints.  By appealing to 
governmental authority and involving the state as a pro-movement force, 
cause lawyer movement into the state may channel movement activity 
toward moderate goals and into institutional, state-centered tactics. 
It is important to note that I am not suggesting that cause lawyers who 
move into the state are inevitably cause lawyering in their government 
positions.  Rather, I am asking what their cause lawyering experience and 
ties mean for their work in the government and what their government 
position means for the cause.21  On some occasions, we can observe 
government lawyers clearly wielding state power for movement gains.  
Most of the time, however, the relationship between social movement 
activism and state power is much more subtle and complex.  While my 
research does not directly shed light on lawyer motives and identity, 
government lawyers appear aware of the responsibilities of their positions 
and likely contemplate the need for agency legitimacy and client 
accountability.22  Accordingly, their work to advance social movement 
 
include as cause lawyering experience academic positions that involve some advocacy 
through writing, clinical work, or pro bono work, see STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:  THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 42–45 (2008); 
Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
1879, 1893 (2007); Anna-Maria Marshall, Social Movement Strategies and the Participatory 
Potential of Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 164, 176 (Austin Sarat 
& Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006); significant private practice pro bono or fee-generating work 
on behalf of a cause, see Marshall, supra note 20, at 177; Michael McCann & Helena 
Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”:  A Relational Analysis of Social Movement 
Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING:  POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 4, at 261, 265; and nonlitigation (or even 
nonlegal) positions at a public interest or social movement organization, see McCann & 
Silverstein, supra note 20, at 265; Neta Ziv, Cause Lawyers, Clients, and the State:  
Congress as a Forum for Cause Lawyering During the Enactment of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 4, at 
211, 214.  I do not, however, include lawyers who simply identify with or are members of a 
cause-oriented organization.  Therefore, my analysis does not consider an individual a cause 
lawyer merely because she supports the ACLU with financial contributions or affiliates with 
and attends events sponsored by the Federalist Society. 
 21. Indeed, as research on insider feminists shows, many feminist activists entered 
government service for career-oriented, rather than cause-oriented, reasons. See LEE ANN 
BANASZAK, THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE STATE 173–74 (2010). 
 22. There is a voluminous literature considering the client identity of government 
lawyers. See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1033, 1050–52 & nn.67–73 (2008).  While the cause may at times fit within 
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goals is more likely to emerge when their government positions dictate—or 
at least make legitimate space for—such work.  Ultimately, while I point to 
some instances of straightforward cause lawyering work inside the state, I 
am generally constructing a more nuanced picture of movement-state 
overlap in which cause lawyer movement in and out of the state aids, often 
in subtle ways, advances within the government and facilitates (a particular 
form of) movement progress. 
My intervention focuses on filling a substantial gap in cause lawyering 
theory by exploring the overlapping and dynamic relationship between 
cause lawyers and state power.  I rely on publicly available documents, 
media accounts, and research in social movement theory, political science, 
and antidiscrimination law to suggest a general account of cause lawyers 
within the state.  This Article supplies neither a case study of specific cause 
lawyers in a particular setting nor an analysis of lawyer identity and 
motivation.  Instead, I attempt to open doors to both additional theoretical 
developments and qualitative research on cause lawyers in government 
positions.  While interviewing former government lawyers poses serious 
challenges, future work should attempt to do so.  Following in the rich 
tradition of socio-legal research reliant on in-depth, qualitative studies of 
lawyers themselves, such work could elaborate, qualify, and perhaps correct 
the claims advanced here about the roles that cause lawyers moving in and 
out of the state can and do play in service of the causes with which they 
identify. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I explains how cause lawyering 
scholarship generally has neglected the existence of cause lawyer 
movement into the state.  Part II turns to social movement theory on 
movement-state overlap to inform an analysis of cause lawyers in 
government positions.  Like cause lawyering scholarship, which largely 
locates lawyers outside and in opposition to the state, social movement 
theory traditionally situates movements operating independent of and 
against the state.  Recently, however, social movement scholars have 
acknowledged the overlapping and interdependent relationship between 
movements and the state and, in doing so, have uncovered movement 
activists within the state.  This work on movement-state overlap contributes 
to both a more dynamic account of cause lawyering and a more contextual 
approach to the state’s role in movement progress.  Accordingly, Part III 
identifies four impacts cause lawyers inside the state may produce:  
(1) reforming the state; (2) shaping state personnel and priorities; 
(3) harnessing state power for shared movement-state objectives; and 
(4) facilitating and mediating movement-state relationships.  Finally, Part 
IV points to some of the constraints involved when cause lawyers move 
inside the state, specifically focusing on the channeling of movement 
activity into moderate goals and institutional tactics. 
 
objectives of the agency, the President, or the public interest, government lawyers do not 
serve a cause in the same ways as lawyers working at social movement organizations. 
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I.  LAWYER-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN CAUSE LAWYERING SCHOLARSHIP 
By addressing the way in which cause lawyering scholarship traditionally 
situates cause lawyers operating against and outside the state, this Part 
identifies a significant gap in the cause lawyering literature.  Socio-legal 
scholars generally have focused on lawyers working against the status quo 
and, therefore, inevitably struggling to resist and challenge the state.  When 
cause lawyering scholars place lawyers in closer proximity to the state, they 
tend to focus on lawyer-state cooperation, which maintains space between 
cause lawyers and the state.  In this view, cause lawyers occasionally 
interact with state officials, but they are not state actors themselves.  The 
handful of scholarly contributions that focus on cause lawyers as state 
actors tend to feature non-U.S. lawyers working within emerging 
democracies or transformed state structures.23  In the U.S. context, the few 
treatments of government cause lawyers depict occasional or newly minted 
cause lawyers; these lawyers take up the cause through their state positions 
rather than enter the state as cause lawyers.  Scholarship on conservative 
cause lawyers provides an important exception, as it meaningfully explores 
the movement of cause lawyers in and out of government.  This Part shows 
that, notwithstanding this notable exception, the cause lawyering literature 
generally has neglected a common and significant phenomenon—cause 
lawyer movement in and out of the state. 
A.  Cause Lawyers Against the State 
Many of the central contributions to the cause lawyering literature locate, 
almost instinctively, cause lawyers against the state.  To a great extent, this 
makes sense since, as pioneering cause lawyering scholars Professors 
Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold first defined it, cause lawyering “is 
frequently directed at altering some aspect of the social, economic, and 
political status quo.”24  In this sense, “cause lawyers . . . are usually 
swimming against the prevailing political tide”25 and therefore struggling 
against the power and preferences of the state.  Indeed, some scholars have 
observed the tension in cause lawyers’ use of the legal system itself; 
lawyers appeal to law even as the legal system authorizes and perpetuates 
the unjust treatment they challenge.26  In this view, the state, including the 
legal system, inflicts the harm cause lawyers oppose.27 
 
 23. While I draw some insights from work on cause lawyering in other countries, my 
analysis is geared toward the domestic context. 
 24. Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 4, at 4. 
 25. Id. at 8. 
 26. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Breaking the Law:  Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for 
Social Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 723, 730 (1991); cf. Terence C. Halliday, Politics and 
Civic Professionalism:  Legal Elites and Cause Lawyers, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1013, 
1042 (1999).  In an influential article on the difficult negotiation by lawyers representing 
causes with which they identify, Professor Nancy Polikoff discusses how lawyers for lesbian 
and gay activists planning civil disobedience might consider “honest discussion with police 
officers, prison guards, and court personnel . . . [to] educate these groups about the 
protestors’ motivation to break the law.” Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?  The Role 
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Consistent with this picture of cause lawyers against the state, work on 
cause lawyers’ roles and practice settings largely focuses on lawyers in 
nongovernmental settings:  staff lawyers at movement organizations, 
independent cause lawyers who work on movement cases for a fee, private 
practice attorneys performing pro bono work, and lawyers who work for the 
cause in nonlegal roles.28  Even as socio-legal scholars recognize the 
diversity of experiences and institutional locations that map onto cause 
lawyering practice,29 they have not devoted sustained attention to cause 
lawyers in government. 
Of course, government-funded legal services work has historically served 
as one of the most important settings for cause lawyering practice.30  While 
these lawyers have a dependent relationship on state support,31 it is clear 
that they (ideally) operate with professional independence from the state 
 
Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 452 (1996).  These groups, 
though, are characterized as “agents of an oppressive state,” such that “[t]hose who oppose 
advance discussion with officials are often offended by the concept of negotiating with the 
very people who embody the value system that they are opposing.” Id. at 452, 462. 
 27. Professor Sameer Ashar, however, makes the compelling point that with neoliberal 
shifts in governance, resistance that would have been aimed at the state may now target 
private third parties. See Ashar, supra note 20, at 1917.  While Ashar’s focus on lawyers for 
“resistance movements” captures the confrontational relationship of cause lawyers to both 
the state and powerful private actors, see id. at 1879, his case study of immigrant worker 
mobilization in New York demonstrates that the state may at times serve more as an 
audience than as either a target or an ally. See id. at 1917–18. 
 28. See McCann & Silverstein, supra note 20, at 265 (concentrating on three types of 
cause lawyers, all of which operate outside the state); see also Kathleen M. Erskine & Judy 
Marblestone, The Movement Takes the Lead:  The Role of Lawyers in the Struggle for a 
Living Wage in Santa Monica, California, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 249, 258 (addressing multiple cause lawyer categories, all of which are 
outside the state); Marshall, supra note 20, at 164, 167–68 (describing practice settings 
outside the state in which cause lawyers work against the state).  In addition, there is a robust 
literature on lawyers located in law school clinics, see, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics 
and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 455 (2008), including some analysis of 
political pressure on clinics at public law schools. See David Luban, Taking Out the 
Adversary:  The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 237 
(2003). 
 29. See, e.g., Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinski, Destruction of Houses and Construction of 
a Cause:  Lawyers and Bedouins in the Israeli Courts, in CAUSE LAWYERING:  POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 4, at 230–31 (“It is in the 
course of engaging in various professional practices that the possibility of becoming or 
functioning as a lawyer for a cause is realized.”). 
 30. See Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices:  Lawyers, Clients, and Social Change, 
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 415 (1996) (referring to lawyers at federally funded legal 
services offices as “the canonical model for social change lawyering”).  On the rise of the 
Legal Services Program, see TELES, supra note 20, at 30–35. 
 31. Interestingly, according to Professor Gary Bellow, government lawyers, including 
Bellow himself, “orchestrated a set of conferences, speeches, alliances, meetings, and intra-
agency agreements that led to the establishment of the federal legal services program under 
the Office of Economic Opportunity.” Gary Bellow, Steady Work:  A Practitioner’s 
Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 298 (1996).  In this 
sense, the legal services program itself, which facilitated cause lawyering against the state, 
emerged from cause lawyers inside the state. 
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and often in opposition to the state.32  Indeed, the assault on government-
funded legal services underscores the oppositional position of these lawyers 
vis-à-vis the state.  As Professor David Luban has documented, the 
conservative turn of the state brought with it an attack, both substantive and 
financial, on publicly funded legal services lawyers and effectively 
prevented such lawyers from using state funds to challenge state power.33  
In their empirical study of the public interest law sector, Professors Laura 
Beth Nielsen and Catherine Albiston show that while an increasing number 
of public interest law organizations receive a substantial amount of their 
funding from government agencies, these organizations have “become 
increasingly constrained”:  they “largely provide direct legal services, and 
are statutorily prohibited from engaging in many law reform activities.”34  
Ultimately, conservatives successfully curtailed legal services lawyers 
precisely because of such lawyers’ inclination to launch structural attacks 
on state policies. 
Socio-legal scholars have also treated public defenders as cause 
lawyers.35  Subject to less political scrutiny than legal services work, the 
public defender’s office might represent a particularly attractive arena for 
cause lawyering.36  Again, though, public defenders are salaried 
government employees who oppose the state by representing those accused 
in criminal proceedings.  Qualitative work on public defenders confirms 
this oppositional orientation.37  In the end, both legal services attorneys and 
public defenders, while funded by the government, frequently use those 
government funds, even with current constraints, to represent subordinated 
or vulnerable individuals and groups against the government. 
 
 32. See Martha Minow, Lawyering for Human Dignity, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 143, 148 (2003) (“[A] legal services lawyer speaks for the private client, not for the 
government.”); see also Stephen Meili, Consumer Cause Lawyers in the United States:  
Lawyers for the Movement or a Movement unto Themselves, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, supra note 20, at 120, 124 (explaining how legal services lawyers funded by 
the government handled consumer protection issues); Corey S. Shdaimah, Intersecting 
Identities:  Cause Lawyers as Legal Professionals and Social Movement Actors, in CAUSE 
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 20, at 220, 235–37 (explaining how 
conservative-driven funding cuts to “left activist law organizations” were designed to 
prevent those organizations from representing subordinated groups against the state). 
 33. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY 298–302 (1988); 
Luban, supra note 28.  For a robust defense of political lawyering by legal services attorneys, 
see LUBAN, supra note 33, at 317–91. 
 34. Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 20, at 1619. 
 35. See Stuart Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering:  Practice 
Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 229 (1998) 
(including two public defenders in their sample of salaried cause lawyers, a group that also 
included lawyers at “privately funded social action organizations”). 
 36. See id. at 232 (“[T]he public defender’s office has provided a relatively stable work 
site for transgressive cause lawyering.  Indeed, the ever more punitive political climate has, 
in a perverse way, contributed to the attractions of public defense work.”).  For an 
explanation of why “the public defender system is not nearly as controversial as the Legal 
Services Corporation,” see LUBAN, supra note 33, at 268. 
 37. See Scheingold & Bloom, supra note 35, at 231 (explaining that one of the lawyer 
subjects “sees his public defender work as ‘fighting the state’”). 
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B.  Cause Lawyers with the State 
Some cause lawyering scholars have complicated the traditional picture 
of lawyer-state opposition and instead have uncovered how cause lawyers 
interact with state actors.  To the extent this work situates cause lawyers in 
closer proximity to the state, it moves away from the conventional picture 
of lawyer-state adversarialism.  But it rarely situates lawyers as participants 
in state institutions.  Instead, this work continues to locate lawyers outside 
the state, yet cooperating with the state in advancing the cause.38 
Many of the contributions identifying cause lawyer cooperation with the 
state emerge from less conventional lawyering contexts—those that defy 
the very assumptions of adversarial litigation characteristic of most 
lawyering scholarship.  In other words, when scholars look to cause lawyers 
engaging in less conventional forms of lawyering more generally, they also 
may observe different relationships with the state.  Studies of legislative 
lawyering, for example, suggest an interactive and collaborative, rather than 
purely adversarial, relationship between cause lawyers and the state.39  In 
her study of the role of cause lawyers in the campaign for the ADA, 
Professor Neta Ziv shows the cooperative relationships between legislators, 
on one hand, and lawyers for the disability movement, on the other hand.40  
In fact, Ziv’s 2001 study highlights leading disability rights lawyer Chai 
Feldblum, now an EEOC Commissioner, to understand the way in which 
legislative cause lawyers build bridges between their social movement 
clients and lawmakers whom they are attempting to persuade.41  Yet, in this 
view, cause lawyers remain outside the state, exerting influence on those in 
government positions.42 
New Governance regimes, in which lawyers participate in public-private 
partnerships in more flexible regulatory systems, also suggest a more 
cooperative lawyer-state relationship.43  In the health care context, 
 
 38. Scheingold’s concept of an “institutional continuum” provides a helpful way to 
conceptualize the various relationships between cause lawyers and the state. See Stuart A. 
Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and Democracy in Transnational Perspective:  A Postscript, 
in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 4, at 382, 389 
(“Positioning can be measured along an institutional continuum, ranging from participation 
in, and cooperation with, state structures to maintaining an arm’s-length relationship with the 
state through construction of adversarial and confrontational strategies.”). 
 39. See Ziv, supra note 20, at 214 (“Legislative cause lawyering stands in contrast to the 
archetypal cause-lawyering model in which the state is the central source of abuse against 
individuals.”). 
 40. See id. at 214. 
 41. See id. at 211. 
 42. Professor Jennifer Gordon describes how a state-based labor movement became an 
inside player with influence over state decision making. See Jennifer Gordon, A Movement in 
the Wake of a New Law:  The United Farm Workers and the California Agricultural Labor 
Relations Act, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 20, at 277, 284 
(explaining, “the [United Farm Workers] was able to make the law more advantageous by 
using its political clout to guide the choice of members for the first Agricultural Labor 
Relations Board (ALRB), resulting in a pro-UFW supermajority of four to one”). 
 43. See Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 324–26 
(2009). 
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Professor Louise Trubek explains how, rather than engage in traditionally 
adversarial activity, lawyers play more flexible and collaborative roles as 
they negotiate and manage relationships between public and private 
actors.44  Similarly, in his study of community economic development 
(CED), Professor Scott Cummings explores the cooperative relationship 
between public entities and lawyers for marginalized groups.45  In CED, 
lawyers “de-emphasize adversarial organizing in favor of collaboration 
with business and governmental partners.”46  Still, the lawyers in these 
studies do not operate from inside the state; instead, they have episodic 
interactions with the state that are cooperative, rather than confrontational. 
More recent scholarship analyzing traditional lawyer modes, such as 
litigation against the state, has acknowledged and explored the cooperative 
relationships between cause lawyers and government actors.  For instance, 
in a case study of same-sex marriage litigation in Vermont, Professors 
Patricia Woods and Scott Barclay show that cause lawyers “worked in 
communication with key actors within the administrative and legislative 
arms of the state for several years in determining the most effective moment 
to bring the case to the Vermont Supreme Court.”47  While this account 
makes a crucial advance by uncovering the collaborative relationship 
between cause lawyers and government actors, it nonetheless maintains 
distance between the movement and the state.  That “cause lawyers and 
state actors may engage in mutually beneficial interactions”48 suggests that 
these two groups remain distinct.49 
C.  (Cause?) Lawyers Inside the State 
To the extent that cause lawyering scholarship has devoted attention to 
cause lawyers occupying government positions, it has generally emerged 
from non-U.S. studies, particularly in countries with emerging democracies 
or with recent state transformations.  The few scholars who have attended to 
government cause lawyers in the United States have focused on what I term 
 
 44. See Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance:  Advocating 
for Healthcare, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575, 600; see also Ashar, supra note 20, at 1922 
(documenting the work that lawyers do on behalf of “resistance movements,” Ashar 
acknowledges how lawyers help “movement organizations . . . facilitate fragile 
collaborations with agencies”). 
 45. See Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering:  Community Economic 
Development in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 
note 20, at 302. 
 46. Id. at 303. 
 47. See Patricia J. Woods & Scott W. Barclay, Cause Lawyers as Legal Innovators with 
and Against the State:  Symbiosis or Opposition?, 45 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 203, 219 
(2008). 
 48. Id. at 205. 
 49. See id. at 215 (“[T]he particular state actors who join forces with cause lawyers may 
be wholly supportive of the normative agenda of the social movement at least vis-à-vis the 
specific issue at hand.  It is in this sense that cause lawyers and state actors may engage in 
mutually beneficial interactions that serve one another’s goals (those goals may or may not 
be served entirely equally in each case).”). 
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occasional or newly minted cause lawyers—lawyers who come to the cause 
through their state positions and then leverage those positions to act on 
behalf of the cause.  Important exceptions, however, emerge from studies of 
conservative cause lawyers. 
1.  Lawyers Abroad 
Scholars exploring non-U.S. settings have devoted the most sustained 
attention to cause lawyers operating inside the state, and some have noted 
the way in which their insights depart from the oppositional assumptions of 
most cause lawyering scholarship.50  Much of this attention abroad is 
attributable to lawyers’ roles in state-building and democratization.  Cause 
lawyers in repressive states may enter the state to strengthen the rule of law 
and build a more responsive and legitimate government.51  In other nations, 
state transformation may feature activist lawyers moving into the 
government apparatus they worked to construct.  For example, South 
African cause lawyers entered their new democratic government to support 
and shape its institutions.52  These lawyers did not experience a 
contradiction between their former work against the state and their new 
work in government since, as Constitutional Court president Arthur 
Chaskalson put it, the “‘struggle was always for law.’”53 
Cause lawyers inside the state have received scant attention in nations 
with long-term, stable democracies.  In a rare exception, Professor Yoav 
Dotan explores the motivations and identities of cause lawyers in Israel who 
switch sides, or “‘cross[] the lines,’” moving from public interest 
 
 50. See Yoav Dotan, The Global Language of Human Rights:  Patterns of Cooperation 
between State and Civil Rights Lawyers in Israel, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A 
GLOBAL ERA, supra note 4, at 244 (“[I]t is generally assumed that cause lawyers operate 
from within civil society, as opposed to operating from within the legal and professional 
apparatus of the state, which in their case becomes the object of their attacks in courts.”); 
Heinz Klug, Local Advocacy, Global Engagement:  The Impact of Land Claims Advocacy on 
the Recognition of Property Rights in the South African Constitution, in CAUSE LAWYERING 
AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 4, at 264, 266 (“Unlike most assumptions about 
cause lawyering, which envisions the practice as oppositional, and the law as checking 
power, South Africa’s democratic transition provides an illustration of cause lawyering being 
transformed.”). 
 51. Professor Lucie White, for instance, explores the role of cause lawyers who “work as 
civil servants inside the state bureaucracy” in Ghana. Lucie White, Two Worlds of Ghanaian 
Cause Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 4, at 35, 
36.  By working in “state agencies that regulate domestic trade and development policies,” 
these lawyers occupy government locations in which they seek to promote “economic 
development policies that respond to the needs and aspirations of Ghana’s common people.” 
Id. at 35. 
 52. See Klug, supra note 50, at 265 (“Many of the most prominent cause lawyers who 
participated in the anti-apartheid movement as lawyers or activists have now gone into the 
new democratic state.”).  Professor Heinz Klug describes this role transition:  “If in the past 
their role and self-image were defined in opposition to the state, the task ahead is to build the 
institutions of the democratic state.  Now this community works to shape the law and is 
engaging and wielding power in its attempt to further the cause.” Id. 
 53. Id. (quoting Interview by Heinz Klug with Arthur Chaskalson, President, 
Constitutional Court of Afr. (1998)). 
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organizations in civil society to state agencies defending the government, 
and vice versa.54  Rather than ultimately characterize such lawyers as “side-
switching” attorneys, Dotan understands them as lawyering for “the rule of 
law” in practice settings both inside and outside the state.55  The cause, as 
Dotan conceptualizes it, is relatively diffuse and state-centered, rather than 
part of a social movement vision on behalf of a subordinated group.  In this 
sense, Dotan’s cause lawyers share common ground with the rule-of-law 
advocates seen in studies of emerging or transformed democracies.  They 
bear little resemblance to the U.S.-based cause lawyers working on behalf 
of discrete groups or overtly political causes.56 
2.  Lawyers in the United States 
The few scholars to focus on government lawyers in the U.S. context 
generally treat them as newly activated lawyers for the cause, rather than 
cause lawyers who enter the state.  For instance, Professor Joshua Wilson’s 
event-centered approach, which identifies cause lawyers simply by their 
work “for or with a given movement or cause during a specific event,” 
conceptualizes government lawyers as occasional cause lawyers—lawyers 
associated with a particular event—rather than committed cause lawyers 
who change practice settings and, in doing so, move in and out of the 
state.57  Indeed, Wilson asks how work on a particular event may lead a 
government lawyer to “becom[e] a cause lawyer.”58  In this sense, the 
 
 54. See Dotan, supra note 50, at 245 (noting the “common phenomena of professional 
mobility . . . in which [lawyers] . . . ‘crossed the lines’”). 
 55. See id. at 250–51 (“[T]hey view themselves as cause lawyers whose causes are 
shared by the lawyers on both sides:  a deep commitment to the idea of the rule of law and a 
commitment to assure the safeguards of fundamental human rights as officers of the court.  
The lawyers who moved from [the civil rights organization] to the government (or vice 
versa) did not, according to this line of reasoning, change their causes, but only their place of 
work.”). 
 56. To the extent Dotan’s lawyers find an analog in U.S. research, they resemble what 
Professor Thomas Hilbink has labeled “proceduralist” cause lawyers. Thomas M. Hilbink, 
You Know the Type . . . :  Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657, 665 
(2004) [hereinafter Hilbink, You Know the Type].  According to Hilbink, the proceduralist 
category “is marked by a belief in the separation of law and politics, and a belief that the 
legal system is essentially fair and just.” Id.  Therefore, the proceduralist lawyer “emphasizes 
individual client representation by lawyers who purport neutrality and nonpartisanship in the 
execution of their professional duties.” Id.  Unlike the other cause lawyering categories that 
Hilbink identifies—elite/vanguard and grassroots—the proceduralist lawyer may operate in 
closer proximity to the state as she seeks to preserve the rule of law. See Thomas Hilbink, 
The Profession, the Grassroots and the Elite:  Cause Lawyering for Civil Rights and 
Freedom in the Direct Action Era, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 
20, at 60, 66.  Yet Hilbink himself recognizes that “there are questions as to whether 
[proceduralist] lawyers engaging in this type of lawyering are cause lawyering at all.” 
Hilbink, You Know the Type, supra note 56, at 665.  Without dedication to the substantive 
agenda behind a particular group, cause, or movement, the proceduralist lawyers—like the 
lawyers in Dotan’s study—seem to share little in common with the more ideologically 
driven and politically committed lawyers typically observed in cause lawyering studies. 
 57. Joshua C. Wilson, It Takes All Kinds:  Observations from an Event-Centered 
Approach to Cause Lawyering, 50 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 169, 171 (2009). 
 58. Id.  
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government lawyers are not cause lawyers before their exposure to—and 
work on behalf of—the cause.59  Ultimately, Wilson argues that “if one 
takes a struggle-centered approach to cause lawyering, state lawyers are a 
relatively successful movement’s ultimate hired guns and cause lawyers.”60  
Under this view, the state attorneys function more as elite allies than as 
indigenous cause lawyers.61 
Consistent with this approach, Professor Steven Berenson documents 
litigation campaigns led by government attorneys against powerful 
industries.62  The lawyers themselves are not movement lawyers newly 
occupying government positions.  Rather, they are government lawyers, 
sympathetic to a particular cause, who take action to support that cause.63  
While the government lawyers use state power to advance a cause,64 they 
neither emerge from a cause lawyering community nor move from 
movement organizations into the state.65 
Perhaps the gap in knowledge about cause lawyer movement into the 
state owes much to the association of cause lawyering with liberal and 
progressive activism.66  Given the state’s pronounced turn toward the right 
over the past several decades, the state may seem particularly inhospitable 
to—and outright hostile toward—traditional cause-lawyering visions.  If we 
look to lawyers inside the state in the mid-twentieth century, however, we 
might emerge with an appreciation for the occasionally productive 
relationship between cause lawyers and the state.  During the New Deal, for 
instance, activist lawyers moved into the state to build and defend the new 
 
 59. See id. at 199 (“Lawyers for the State of Colorado were . . . not specifically cause 
motivated, but they . . . developed certain cause lawyer qualities through their work on the 
[cause litigation].”). 
 60. Id. at 189. 
 61. Underscoring the distance between the movement and the state attorneys, Wilson 
finds that while government lawyers in his case study of abortion-related litigation adopted 
movement rhetoric to some degree, they also employed “frames that provided distance from 
the case’s more political aspects.” Id. at 196. 
 62. See Steven K. Berenson, Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer:  A Study of Three 
High Profile Government Lawsuits, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 457, 458–59 (2009) (documenting 
the Mississippi Attorney General’s suit against the tobacco industry, the New York Attorney 
General’s suit against Merrill Lynch, and the City of Chicago’s suit against the gun 
industry). 
 63. Of course, some lawyers may become government lawyers so that they can lawyer 
for a cause.  Indeed, Berenson notes that then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
entered his government position “with an ambitious vision for the office as an aggressive 
proponent of progressive legal reform advanced through both litigation and regulation.” See 
id. at 475. 
 64. Id. at 458. 
 65. Professor Lynn Mather’s study of the anti-tobacco movement also resonates with 
Berenson’s insights. See Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts:  Lawyers, 
Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 897 (1998).  In our study of 
the California marriage equality movement, Scott Cummings and I included lawyers at the 
San Francisco City Attorney’s Office. See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, 
Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1281–86 (2010). 
 66. Cf. Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 20, at 1598 (explaining that public interest law 
practice developed “largely on the left, based on the early models of effective litigation 
provided by civil rights organizations such as the NAACP”). 
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regime.67  And crucial periods in the civil rights movement witnessed 
significant moments of cause lawyering activity within the state.68  But as 
the state shifted to the right, it offered a less viable practice setting for 
lawyers associated with liberal and progressive causes.69 
To some extent, then, the gap in the cause lawyering literature on 
movement in and out of the state may stem from the conservative turn of 
the state itself and the traditional assumption that cause lawyering is a left-
progressive project.  Accordingly, recent scholarship on conservative cause 
lawyers may supply a fuller recognition of the way in which cause lawyers 
move in and out of government positions.  When we broaden our 
understanding of cause lawyering to include lawyers for the right, we see 
that the federal government has continued to furnish not only a receptive 
site for conservative visions but also an important location for cause 
lawyering practice. 
A growing body of socio-legal scholarship analyzes the rise of the 
conservative public interest law infrastructure.70  Professor Ann Southworth 
provides a comprehensive and revealing study of lawyers for conservative 
causes.71  While she focuses on the nonprofit organizations and public 
interest law firms populated by conservative cause lawyers, at various 
moments she acknowledges the crucial relationship between the 
conservative movement and the state.  Southworth identifies multiple 
intersections between the state apparatus and conservative lawyers, showing 
that lawyers held important positions within Republican presidential 
 
 67. See RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY:  ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW 
DEAL 152 (1995) (showing how academic lawyers both moved into the state and groomed 
younger lawyers to enter the state in defense of the New Deal); Michael McCann & Jeffrey 
Dudas, Retrenchment . . . and Resurgence?  Mapping the Changing Context of Movement 
Lawyering in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 20, 
at 37, 49 (explaining how “New Deal lawyers were joined in the 1950s and 1960s by a new 
generation of cause lawyers who, working both for governmental agencies and for public 
interest firms, practiced on behalf of the disadvantaged”); see also Norman W. Spaulding, 
Independence and Experimentalism in the Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 423 
(2011). 
 68. See McCann & Dudas, supra note 67, at 44 (noting that during the Kennedy and 
Johnson Administrations, “the departments of Justice and Labor . . . provided critical 
incubators for progressive legal visions, training ground for cause-oriented lawyers, and 
allies on a variety of egalitarian projects”). 
 69. See id. (explaining that “as electoral trends shifted, this resource [that is, 
opportunities to undertake progressive lawyering in government agencies] dried up”). 
 70. See generally TELES, supra note 20; Kevin den Dulk, In Legal Culture, But Not of It:  
The Role of Cause Lawyers in Evangelical Legal Mobilization, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 20, at 197; Douglas NeJaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, 
and Recognition:  Accounting for Differences Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303 (2009). 
 71. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT:  PROFESSIONALIZING THE 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008); Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest 
over the Meaning of “Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223 (2005); Ann 
Southworth, John P. Heinz, & Anthony Paik, Lawyers for Conservative Causes:  Clients, 
Ideology, and Social Distance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5 (2003); Ann Southworth, John P. 
Heinz, & Anthony Paik, Lawyers of the Right:  Networks and Organization, 32 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 883 (2007).  
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administrations and, at other times, within conservative legal 
organizations.72 
Similarly, Professor Steven Teles documents the powerful relationships 
between the emerging conservative legal movement and Reagan 
Administration lawyers.73  Conservative lawyers entered government 
service, sought to bring in additional lawyers who had worked for 
conservative causes, and wielded state power both to build the conservative 
legal movement and to advance its agenda inside the government.74  Key 
figures in Teles’s study moved between movement organizations and the 
state.  Demonstrated commitment to—not simply affiliation with—
conservative movement organizations served as an important qualification 
for government employment.  All of the co-founders of the Federalist 
Society, for instance, were hired into the Reagan DOJ.75  And Stephen 
Markman, who founded the Federalist Society’s D.C. chapter, led the 
Office of Legal Policy (OLP), which became a significant force for long-
term strategic planning during the Reagan Administration.76 
After government service, many of the lawyers from the Reagan 
Administration leveraged their government experience to build the 
conservative public interest law infrastructure that Southworth 
documents.77  For instance, while serving in the Reagan Administration, 
Chip Mellor and Clint Bolick developed plans to build a successful 
 
 72. See SOUTHWORTH, supra note 71, at 23, 38 n.24.  Edwin Meese III, who served as 
Attorney General in the Reagan Administration, founded the Pacific Legal Foundation and 
the Crime Victims’ Legal Advocacy Institute; Michael Carvin, who served in the DOJ’s 
Civil Rights Division, was a founding board member of the Center for Individual Rights; 
Roger and Nancy Marzulla, who both served in the Reagan DOJ, founded the Defenders of 
Property Rights; Kevin Hasson, who served as attorney-advisor for the DOJ’s Office of 
Legal Counsel, founded the Becket Fund. Id. at 38 n.24. 
 73. See Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy:  Reagan’s Lawyers and the 
Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 69 (2009).  Teles does not use 
a cause lawyering lens, but his work significantly contributes to our understanding of cause 
lawyers. 
 74. See id. at 62–63. 
 75. See TELES, supra note 20, at 141.  While I am not considering mere affiliation with 
the Federalist Society a cause lawyering credential, I am considering Federalist Society 
leaders to be serving cause lawyering roles to some extent.  Even though they did not engage 
in conventional legal advocacy in their Federalist Society roles, leaders of the organization 
played a crucial role in the development, organization, and success of the conservative legal 
movement and in the emergence of conservative legal principles. See id. at 135–80.  
Although the Federalist Society at one point considered starting a litigation center, the group 
ultimately rejected the idea and instead provides a pro bono clearinghouse to connect 
volunteer lawyers with conservative causes. See id. at 154–57.  Some Federalist Society 
leaders rejected a plan to engage in direct litigation activity in part because it could have 
“jeopardized the participation of many of the Society’s members, especially those in 
government.” Id. at 155.  Indeed, one Reagan Administration official noted that he would 
have had to resign from the Federalist Society if it began a litigation center. See id. 
 76. See id. at 145. 
 77. See Teles, supra note 73, at 69. 
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conservative public interest law organization.78  Eventually, they founded 
the Institute for Justice, an influential conservative public interest firm.79 
Ultimately, scholarship on conservative cause lawyers alerts us to the 
existence and importance of the movement of cause lawyers in and out of 
the state.  The lawyers that Southworth and Teles identify influenced the 
government’s relationship to the conservative movement and leveraged 
their government experience to strengthen and advance the movement itself.  
In both subtle and not-so-subtle ways, they built an administrative regime 
that could furnish a key site for conservative cause lawyering. 
This work on the conservative legal movement provides an important 
map of individuals moving in and out of state service in a specific 
movement context.  In doing so, it contributes to our understanding of both 
conservative movement mobilization and bureaucratic activity.  Yet it 
focuses on different questions than those addressed in this Article.  
Southworth expertly charts the development of conservative cause 
lawyering, but does not devote sustained attention to the state.  Teles 
explores the conservative transformation of the executive branch, but does 
not use a cause lawyering lens.  This Article, in contrast, intervenes directly 
in cause lawyering scholarship to offer a more general exploration of the 
impacts cause lawyers in government positions may have on both the state 
and the movement.  By attending to the overlapping and mutually 
constitutive relationship between movements and the state, the analysis that 
follows brings social movement theory to cause lawyering scholarship to 
better understand the phenomenon of cause lawyer movement into the state. 
II.  MOVEMENT-STATE OVERLAP IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH 
A substantial amount of cause lawyering scholarship focuses explicitly 
on lawyers’ roles representing social movements.80  The tendency to see 
cause lawyers outside and against the state may be more pronounced when 
scholars specifically contextualize cause lawyers within movements.81  Like 
the cause lawyering literature detailed in Part I, social movement work has 
traditionally conceptualized the movement and the state as largely distinct 
 
 78. See TELES, supra note 20, at 79–82. 
 79. See id. at 82–85. 
 80. Indeed, one of the volumes of Sarat and Scheingold’s cause lawyering series centers 
on “[c]ause [l]awyers and [s]ocial [m]ovements.” CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, supra note 20.  Even outside that volume, a number of recent case studies of 
cause lawyers have looked to specific movement contexts. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, 
Litigation at Work:  Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1617 (2011); 
Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 65; Michael E. Waterstone et al., Disability Cause 
Lawyers, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1287 (2012). See generally Ashar, supra note 20. 
 81. See, e.g., Susan Bibler Coutin, Cause Lawyering and Political Advocacy:  Moving 
Law on Behalf of Central American Refugees, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 101; den Dulk, supra note 70, at 197; Marshall, supra note 20, at 164; 
Corey S. Shdaimah, Intersecting Identities:  Cause Lawyers as Legal Professionals and 
Social Movement Actors, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 20, at 
220–21. 
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entities locked in oppositional, rather than cooperative, relations.82  In this 
view, movements agitate for change and seek to disrupt the status quo, 
while the state represses or resists the movement in an attempt to maintain 
existing power relations.83  In fact, social movement scholars have viewed 
state support with suspicion, seeing the potential for cooptation, 
moderation, and demobilization.84 
Even when social movement scholars explore the benefits of work with 
the state, they typically portray state actors as allies—bystanders convinced 
to support some part of the movement’s agenda.  These state allies may 
then use their privileged positions to advance the movement’s cause.85  In 
this view, state actors are outside the movement, and the movement remains 
outside the state.86  Accordingly, helpful government officials look much 
like the newly activated or occasional government cause lawyers observed 
in Wilson’s and Berenson’s cause lawyering studies. 
More recent social movement scholarship complicates the conventional 
understanding of the movement and the state as distinct and mutually 
 
 82. See, e.g., Leo d’Anjou & John Van Male, Between Old and New:  Social Movements 
and Cultural Change, 3 MOBILIZATION: INT’L J. 207, 207 (1998) (explaining that 
“movements concern the dynamics of challengers vs. authorities”); see also LEE ANN 
BANASZAK, THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE STATE 2 (2010) (“[T]he view 
that social movements are clearly and completely ‘outside the state’ prevails throughout both 
theoretical and empirical discussions of social movements generally.”). 
 83. See Wayne A. Santoro & Gail M. McGuire, Social Movement Insiders:  The Impact 
of Institutional Activists on Affirmative Action and Comparable Worth Policies, 44 SOC. 
PROBS. 503, 503 (1997); see also John A. Noakes & Hank Johnston, Frames of Protest:  A 
Road Map to a Perspective, in FRAMES OF PROTEST:  SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE FRAMING 
PERSPECTIVE 1, 18 (Hank Johnston & John A. Noakes eds., 2005).  Social movement 
theory’s maintenance of movement-state opposition may reflect the field’s structural 
emphasis, which was dominant until relatively recently. See Jeff Goodwin & James M. 
Jasper, Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine:  The Structural Bias of Political Process 
Theory, 14 SOC. F. 27, 34 (1999); John A. Noakes, Official Frames in Social Movement 
Theory:  The FBI, HUAC, and the Communist Threat in Hollywood, in FRAMES OF PROTEST, 
supra note 83, at 89, 90.  Indeed, the structural view correlates with social movement 
scholars’ traditional preference for confrontational, rather than institutional tactics—
suggesting that a movement’s power resides in resisting, rather than working with, state 
power. See Goodwin & Jasper, supra note 83, at 34.  More recently, the cultural turn in 
sociology has influenced social movement theory, and many scholars have taken a cultural 
lens to established frameworks for social movement analysis. See William A. Gamson & 
David S. Meyer, Framing Political Opportunity, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS:  POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL 
FRAMINGS 275, 279 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996).  Framing—the most recent major 
social movement theoretical intervention—makes culture an important dimension of 
movement activity. See Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment:  Legal 
Framing Processes and Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. 
SOC. 1718, 1721 (2006). 
 84. See, e.g., FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S 
MOVEMENTS:  WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL xi (1977). 
 85. See, e.g., SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT:  ORGANIZATION 
AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 153 (1991). 
 86. See Santoro & McGuire, supra note 83, at 504 (“Implicit in resource mobilization 
theory is the view that movement actors and political opportunities are conceptually distinct 
and mutually exclusive.”). 
 668 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
exclusive entities.  This work builds on a more complex understanding of 
the state itself, conceptualizing the state as disaggregated and dynamic.87  A 
number of institutions and organizations constitute the state, and each 
presents different opportunities and constraints to social movements.88  
Furthermore, the state is composed of personnel—actual individuals—with 
different experiences, motivations, and goals.89  And the individuals who 
occupy state positions respond to large-scale social and cultural shifts.90  By 
stressing the fragmented institutional structure and changing personnel of 
the state, as well as the cultural dimensions of the state, recent social 
movement work rejects a monolithic treatment of the state and resists 
simply correlating political opportunity with the party in power.91  Instead, 
a variety of competing interests, arrangements, and individuals constitute 
the state.  Therefore, opportunities for social movement activism vary 
across the state and change over time.92 
Social movement scholars increasingly use this more sophisticated 
understanding of the state to study specific movements and to suggest 
broader theoretical approaches with which to analyze social movement 
activity.93  For instance, in their study of the women’s rights movement, 
 
 87. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 16 (“[W]hile the state as a whole has specific 
interests, many of the organizations that comprise the state have additional interests, 
resulting in ‘a set of pluralistic goals.’  The plurality of goals can lead state actors to act in 
opposition to each other.”) (citations omitted); Sidney Tarrow, States and Opportunities:  
The Political Structuring of Social Movements, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, supra note 83, at 41, 51 (“[S]tate elites are far from neutral between different 
social actors and movements.”); see also Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation As 
a Social Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 72–73 (2011), 
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_96_Albiston.pdf (positioning the state as dynamic 
and active). 
 88. BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 17–18. 
 89. See id. at 19–20. 
 90. See id. at 20. 
 91. See id. at 184. 
 92. See id. at 16–21.  Some cause lawyering scholars have noted the fragmented nature 
of the state. See Sarat & Scheingold, State Transformation, supra note 4, at 4 (devoting a 
section to “[t]he [d]isaggregated [s]tate”); Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power:  
Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING:  POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 4, at 69, 102 (“The state is not monolithic:  
power is divided among branches and within them; institutions and officials differ in 
incentive and culture.”).  Unlike most cause lawyering scholars, Woods and Barclay center 
the state as an object of inquiry. See Woods & Barclay, supra note 47, at 205.  They argue 
that “attention to the disaggregated state allows an opening for scholars to investigate a 
wider range of possible relations between cause lawyers and state actors than assumed by the 
oppositional/transgressive model at work in early research on cause lawyering.” Id. at 206.  
In other words, a more relational and contingent conceptualization of the state complicates 
the traditionally oppositional and adversarial account of cause lawyers. See id.  Nonetheless, 
Woods and Barclay stop short of considering cause lawyers inside the state. 
 93. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 187 (arguing in her study of the women’s 
movement that “we can better understand all social movements if we view the movement-
state intersection as a central theoretical concept with identifiable dimensions”); MARK 
WOLFSON, THE FIGHT AGAINST BIG TOBACCO:  THE MOVEMENT, THE STATE, AND THE 
PUBLIC’S HEALTH 13 (2001) (showing how the state became part of the anti-tobacco 
movement in a process he labels movement-state “interpenetration”).  By focusing on 
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Professors Wayne Santoro and Gail McGuire argue that the inability to see 
the existence of movement actors inside the state obscures the movement’s 
influence on comparable worth policies; the women’s movement, they 
claim, shaped those policies “through institutional rather than non-
institutional activists.”94  Their research uncovers the importance of 
institutional channels for movement advances and the benefits movements 
may reap by having activists operating in those channels.  Yet institutional 
activism is not equally available to all movements and is not conducive to 
all issues.95  Both the degree to which movements enjoy insider status in the 
political structure and the technical nature of the underlying issues influence 
the impact of institutional activism.96 
Professor Lee Ann Banaszak’s study of the women’s movement offers 
the most comprehensive treatment of the impact of movement activists 
inside the state.  Banaszak stresses the close relationships and overlapping 
membership between indigenous movement organizations and feminist 
activists and organizations in the federal government.97  She shows that 
some feminist activists inside the state were able to publicly pursue 
movement causes through government bodies dedicated to women’s 
rights,98 while others advanced the cause in less explicit and overt ways, 
sometimes operating “under the radar” of higher-level government 
officials.99  All the while, the work of feminists in government responded to 
and shaped social movement activity outside the state.  In the end, 
Banaszak’s analysis constructs a dynamic and complex picture of 
movement-state intersections in which feminist activists in government 
positions harnessed (or limited) state power to help the women’s movement 
advance. 
 
lawsuits initiated by state Attorneys General, which placed government lawyers in 
collaboration with their nongovernment counterparts, Professor Mark Wolfson highlights the 
importance of legal arenas as venues for movement-state relationships. See WOLFSON, supra 
note 93, at 142–45.  Yet rather than focus on movement activists moving into the state, 
Wolfson reconceptualizes allies in government as movement actors.  In this sense, Wolfson’s 
intervention recognizes the existence of the movement inside the state but maintains a 
separation between indigenous social movement organizations and state actors.  For 
example, he notes that a lawsuit by the Minnesota Attorney General “was largely if not 
entirely self-initiated—that is, not a direct reaction to pressure from movement 
organizations.” Id. at 142. 
 94. Santoro & McGuire, supra note 83, at 514. 
 95. See id. (finding that “institutional activists in the women’s movement were important 
in determining comparable worth policies while non-institutional actors in the civil rights 
movement affected affirmative action policies”). 
 96. See id. 
 97. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 63–91; see also Lee Ann Banaszak, Moving 
Feminist Activists Inside the American State:  The Rise of a State-Movement Intersection and 
Its Effects on State Policy, in THE UNSUSTAINABLE AMERICAN STATE 223, 237–39 (Lawrence 
Jacobs & Desmond King eds., 2009); Lee Ann Banaszak, Inside and Outside the State:  
Movement Insider Status, Tactics, and Public Policy Achievements, in ROUTING THE 
OPPOSITION:  SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND DEMOCRACY 149, 164–65 (David S. 
Meyer et al. eds., 2005). 
 98. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 87. 
 99. See id. at 180–81. 
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Ultimately, Banaszak’s work and other social movement scholarship on 
movement-state overlap suggest that movements actively alter and shape 
the political opportunity structure.100  Movement activists themselves may 
help constitute the state apparatus, occupying locations in which they can 
use state power for movement purposes.  And they may alter elite 
alignments both by assuming official state positions and by influencing 
other, non-movement state actors.  In other words, by entering and shaping 
the state, the movement may create its own political opportunities and 
harness state power as an important movement resource.101 
How, then, do cause lawyers fit into this complex picture of movement-
state overlap?  While Banaszak focuses on a range of bureaucrats in the 
federal government, her analysis sheds important light on the role of 
lawyers in particular.  Many of the feminist activists in her study were 
attorneys and used legal reform and litigation to advance the movement 
cause.102  Given that legal actors function as important state actors103 and 
litigation serves as a key institutional tactic,104 attention to the work of 
lawyers in the study of movement-state overlap seems crucial.  Once we 
have acknowledged that cause lawyers move into the state, we can begin to 
understand their impact.105  We should ask, as Sarat and Scheingold do 
about cause lawyers more generally, what cause lawyers inside the state do 
for and to the movements with which they identify.106  In doing so, we 
should explore the productive roles that cause lawyers play within the state, 
the delicate balance lawyers strike when they deploy state power in service 
of movement objectives, and the constraints imposed by such movement-
 
 100. As leading social movement theorist Doug McAdam explains, political process 
scholarship has coalesced around the following dimensions of political opportunity: 
1.  [t]he relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system[;] 
2.  [t]he stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically 
undergird a polity[;] 
3.  [t]he presence or absence of elite allies[; and] 
4.  [t]he state’s capacity and propensity for repression. 
Doug McAdam, Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 83, at 23, 27.  McAdam 
notes that the political opportunity structure is dynamic. See id. at 37 (pointing out “the 
typically fluid, reciprocal, unpredictable, and crucially important relationship of social 
movements to structures of political opportunity”). 
 101. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 196 (explaining that “some state-based political 
opportunities are in fact parts of the movement itself”). 
 102. See id. at 31, 61, 124–48. 
 103. See WOLFSON, supra note 93, at 13 (identifying the Minnesota Attorney General as a 
“state agency that is heavily involved, in a proactive way, in tobacco control advocacy”). 
 104. See id. at 209 (explaining the joint state-movement “litigation explosion” in the anti-
tobacco movement). 
 105. The existence of cause lawyers in government relates to the more general absorption 
of social movements into political parties. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Dead or Alive:  
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 215 (2008) 
(noting the incorporation of conservative movements into the Republican party). 
 106. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social 
Movements:  An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 20, 
at 1, 3. 
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state overlap.  In Part III, I take up the positive effects that movements may 
experience when cause lawyers occupy government positions.  In Part IV, I 
address limitations imposed by cause lawyer movement into the state. 
III.  CAUSE LAWYERS AND STATE POWER 
This Part identifies four key impacts that cause lawyers who assume 
government positions may produce:  (1) reforming the state itself; 
(2) shaping state personnel and priorities; (3) harnessing state power for 
shared movement-state goals; and (4) facilitating and mediating 
relationships between the movement and the state.  The impacts I explore 
are not meant to be exhaustive.  Cause lawyers inside the state may serve a 
variety of functions, and I point to only a handful in this Article.  Nor are 
the effects identified meant to apply to all cause lawyers who enter the state.  
Some cause lawyers may do very little to assist their movement colleagues 
or press movement goals once they attain a government position.  
Moreover, I limit my analysis to lawyers in the federal bureaucracy, rather 
than include lawyers in other institutional branches, including elected 
officials and judges, or at state and local levels of government.107  It is 
important to note at the outset that I am not making claims regarding cause 
lawyer identity or motivation, instead leaving such issues for future 
empirical work.  Only through additional research, with interviews of 
lawyers from a range of government locations and with relationships to a 
variety of movements, will we develop a comprehensive and detailed 
account of cause lawyers inside the state.108 
A.  Reforming the State 
Because they occupy positions within the government, cause lawyers 
who have moved into the state enjoy institutional access that allows them to 
 
 107. For the most part, I focus on lawyers serving under more sympathetic 
administrations, neglecting the roles that cause lawyers working during more hostile 
administrations may play.  For an analysis of the work of feminist activists during hostile 
presidential administrations, see BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 162–85.  Professor Guinier 
also notes that during Republican administrations hostile to civil rights some members of the 
civil rights community “anonymously infiltrat[ed] sympathetic federal agencies.” GUINIER, 
supra note 16, at 33. 
 108. I do not directly address issues of lawyer accountability.  When a lawyer who 
previously had an attorney-client relationship that ensured some degree of accountability to 
client interests seeks to advance those interests through government service, where she is 
now accountable to a government client, important issues relating to lawyer domination, 
ethical representation, and governmental legitimacy are implicated.  Of course, even in the 
traditional public interest setting, accountability is a serious issue. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation 
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in 
Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2008); Douglas NeJaime, Note, 
Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between:  Clarifying Organizational Positionalities in 
Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511 (2003). 
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influence policy within the government.109  That is, they may agitate for 
policy change relating specifically to government institutions and may 
shape that policy going forward.110  By moving into the state apparatus, 
government lawyers assume positions that offer opportunities to contest, 
create, and shape rules and norms governing the state itself. 
When looking at activity occurring inside the government and aimed at 
the government itself, certain issues may rise to the fore.  For this 
discussion, I focus on employment practices.  The government acts as a 
(particularly large) employer.  Government employees have a direct stake in 
government employment policies, and they may observe or experience 
discriminatory employment practices.  Therefore, they have incentives to 
challenge government employment discrimination, and their government 
positions provide institutional locations in which to do so. 
As Banaszak’s study shows, the issue of employment was a shared 
concern for women inside the federal bureaucracy and constituted an issue 
on which they could collectively advocate for change, regardless of whether 
they worked in an agency that otherwise addressed women’s rights.111  
Thus, activists inside the state could work to reduce and eliminate sex 
discrimination in government employment.112  Of course, changes in 
employment practices within government influenced feminist activists and 
movement advances outside the state.113  Through mandates governing 
federal contractors, government practices directly impacted employment in 
important nongovernmental settings.114  And the strengthening of equal 
employment practices in government supported claims made by feminist 
activists in a variety of workplace settings.115  In this sense, while work 
inside the government aimed specifically at government practices may in 
some ways represent a fairly limited type of social-change work, such work 
may shape political opportunities for more far-reaching policy and may 
bleed into other arenas. 
 
 109. Indeed, given the large and diffuse make-up of the executive branch, they may do so 
even without direct support from the President or other top-level officials. Cf. Steven G. 
Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution:  A Brief Positive Account 
of the Role of Government Lawyers in the Development of Constitutional Law, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 70 (1998) (“Coordinating the activities of the thousands of executive 
branch employees who are lawyers or even of the hundreds who hold top political legal jobs 
is a difficult task for any administration; it is especially difficult with respect to legal policy 
issues.”). 
 110. Banaszak, for instance, documents feminist activism within government agencies, 
including agencies originally quite hostile to women’s rights. See, e.g., BANASZAK, supra 
note 82, at 111 (discussing the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee to Improve the Status of 
Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies).  She concludes that “insider feminist advocates 
organized themselves within government to help to create a state whose practices and 
policies better reflected feminist principles.” Id. at 188. 
 111. See id. at 141. 
 112. See id. at 143. 
 113. See id. at 188. 
 114. See id. at 146, 188. 
 115. See id. at 146. 
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Although a variety of government employees can articulate claims of 
employment discrimination and press for change within the federal 
bureaucracy, lawyers are especially well situated to agitate for change in 
government policy and shape government employment practices.  
Government regulations and policy, especially those dictating employment, 
are often articulated through legal language, mandates, and norms.  In this 
sense, “lawyers speak the same language as the state.”116  Not only do 
lawyers speak the legal language of state employment policies, but they 
also occupy positions charged with regulating employment practices.  The 
EEOC, for instance, furnishes rules and regulations implementing 
employment discrimination laws and issues guidance for employers on 
legal compliance.117  The EEOC’s interpretations, therefore, have a 
significant impact on workplace equality and the viability of claims alleging 
workplace discrimination.  In addition, within the federal government, the 
EEOC is the body before which federal employees can appeal certain 
claims of workplace discrimination after an adverse ruling from their 
agency.  Having EEOC actors dedicated to strong norms of 
nondiscrimination provides opportunities for the articulation of capacious 
equality norms and improves the protection of federal employees in the 
workplace. 
In January 2011, Berrian, the Chair of the EEOC, which includes 
Feldblum, a strong LGBT rights advocate, made clear that transgender 
EEOC employees are protected against discrimination under the rubric of 
sex discrimination.118  This EEOC statement came after the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) issued a memorandum in 2009 announcing 
that factors unrelated to job performance would not be used as a ground for 
employment decisions for federal employees.119  OPM Director (and 
nonlawyer) John Berry clarified that memorandum by telling journalists, 
“[g]ender identity is a non-work-related factor.”120  Berry, the highest-
ranking openly gay official in the Obama Administration, had long made 
his views on LGBT issues clear, and it was not surprising that the office 
which he heads would take a leading role on the issue of gender-identity 
discrimination within the government.121  Ultimately, in May 2011, OPM 
 
 116. Woods & Barclay, supra note 47, at 215; cf. Ashar, supra note 20, at 1922 (noting 
lawyers’ “technical skills that can be of use in policy advocacy”). 
 117. See Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 118. See Memorandum from Jacqueline A. Berrien, Chair, EEOC, to All Employees (Jan. 
31, 2011) (on file with author) (“EEOC employees are protected by federal laws prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, sex (including pregnancy and gender 
identity), national origin, age, disability, family medical history, or genetic information.”). 
 119. See Autumn Sandeen, OPM Releases Policies on Trans People in the Federal 
Workplace, LGBT WKLY (June 9, 2011), http://lgbtweekly.com/2011/06/09/opm-releases-
policies-on-trans-people-in-the-federal-workplace/. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Pam Wechsler & Aliza Marcus, Gay Obama Nominee Succeeds as Values Turn 
on Rescuing Families, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 20, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ayPMVbGij1KY. 
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issued guidance making clear that transgender federal employees are 
protected against discrimination in the workplace and providing specific 
information on the contours of the nondiscrimination mandate.122 
Of course, in advising their constituents, movement advocates outside the 
government picked up the federal government’s articulation of a 
nondiscrimination mandate for transgender employees.  The National 
Center for Transgender Equality (NCTE), for instance, disseminated 
information on workplace rights in February 2012 that highlights the 
federal government’s “new guidance and protections for transgender federal 
employees.”123  Movement advocates themselves likely had a role in 
pushing the government to take this position.  LGBT media commentary 
specifically noted the role of NCTE’s Mara Keisling in working with the 
government on its new gender-identity policy.124 
More recently, the EEOC issued a unanimous decision in Macy v. 
Holder,125 clarifying that, under the rubric of sex discrimination, Title VII 
protects employees discriminated against based on their transgender 
status.126  While the decision applies generally to Title VII, the facts 
involved an applicant for a position with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.127  That agency treated the applicant’s 
complaint of discrimination based on transgender status as distinct from a 
Title VII (sex discrimination) claim and therefore not subject to the set of 
procedural and substantive rights afforded federal employees lodging 
claims under Title VII.128  Accordingly, in addition to the broader holding 
on the coverage of Title VII for transgender employees, the EEOC decision 
extended important rights specifically to federal employees.  The 
Commission concluded that, contrary to the agency’s determination, the 
applicant possessed a right to request a hearing in front of an EEOC 
administrative judge and the right to appeal the final agency decision to the 
EEOC.129  In this way, the decision provides important rights to federal 
 
 122. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., GUIDANCE REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF 
TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE (2011), available at http://
www.opm.gov/diversity/Transgender/Guidance.asp [hereinafter GUIDANCE REGARDING THE 
EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS]. 
 123. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., Transgender Federal Employees:  Your 
Workplace Rights (Feb. 2012), http://transequality.org/Resources/FederalEmployeesFeb
2012.pdf. 
 124. See Sandeen, supra note 119 (“We have Mara Keisling and the staff of the National 
Center for Transgender Equality to thank for their input to the federal government, most of 
which was adopted by the OPM.”). 
 125. EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20 2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt. 
 126. See id. The substantive dimensions of the decision are discussed more fully in Part 
III.C, infra. 
 127. See id. at 1. 
 128. See id. at 3. 
 129. See id. 
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transgender employees and assures that federal employees may ultimately 
appeal an agency decision to the EEOC, which includes Feldblum.130 
Feldblum herself recently received the first annual EEOC Pride Award 
from the EEOC’s LGBT employee organization.131  The group recognized 
her contributions to significant legal developments, including the Macy 
decision, describing her as “the driving force behind many of our recent 
advancements.”132  And it praised Feldblum as a “strong supporter” of the 
employee group, noting that “many of [its] members have attributed to her 
their comfort with being out in the workplace.”133  A few days later, 
Berrien, the EEOC Chair, recognized Feldblum’s contributions and 
congratulated her on the Pride Award in a letter highlighting LGBT-related 
developments at the EEOC.134  In her EEOC role, Feldblum has not only 
contributed to an LGBT-friendly work environment in her own agency but 
has also, along with her colleagues, secured important nondiscrimination 
rights for LGBT federal employees. 
B.  Shaping State Personnel and Priorities 
In addition to influencing government employment norms and 
regulations to make the government a more open environment for 
movement constituents, cause lawyers inside the state may facilitate the 
hiring of specific movement actors into government positions.  That is, 
through more informal mechanisms, cause lawyers inside the state may 
promote the movement of additional cause lawyers into the state.135  This 
may occur through networks that share information about government 
hiring, provide advice and mentorship during the selection process, and 
furnish references and recommendations.136  Ultimately, these informal 
processes may lead to more movement actors entering government service, 
thus allowing change within the government to continue (even during more 
hostile administrations137) and perhaps creating additional opportunities for 
such change.138 
 
 130. Overview of Federal Sector EEO Complaint Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/complaint_
overview.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 131. See EEOC Pride’s Presentation of the First “EEOC Pride Award” to Commissioner 
Chai Feldblum (on file with author). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Letter from Jacqueline A. Berrien, Chair, EEOC, to Colleagues (June 18, 2012) 
[hereinafter June 18 Berrien Letter]. 
 135. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 100 (explaining how a feminist activist inside the 
state “was often consulted on who should serve in government commissions dealing with 
‘women’s issues’”). 
 136. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 3, at 22–23 (describing the informal 
ways in which job applicants are referred to DOJ officials). 
 137. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 181 (explaining how “activists[] take actions to 
help the movement within the bureaucracy even under adverse political conditions”). 
 138. See Teles, supra note 73, at 70 (finding that populating “agencies with young 
movement conservatives was also a way to ensure greater control over agencies that the 
White House could only exercise distant supervision of”). 
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While efforts to shift movement lawyers into government may occur 
sporadically and without coordination in some contexts,139 they may in 
other instances constitute part of a more deliberate and widespread strategy 
of recruitment.  Teles shows how conservative movement actors shaped the 
federal government in their favor by moving the next generation of 
movement conservatives into lower-level government positions and 
grooming them for eventual leadership.140  Indeed, Teles argues that 
Reagan Administration officials engaged in a “very conscious effort . . . to 
build up and burnish the credentials of a new generation of young 
conservative lawyers, both through hiring and mentoring them, as well as 
helping to support the nascent Federalist Society—all of whose founders 
were hired by the [DOJ].”141  In this way, conservative movement lawyers 
in high-level government positions worked to mold the federal bureaucracy 
in their own image. 
Ultimately, Reagan Administration lawyers in the DOJ transformed both 
the federal government and the external environment by implementing a 
long-term, law-centered agenda.142  After incorporating movement lawyers 
into the federal bureaucracy, DOJ officials relied on movement 
organizations like the Federalist Society to connect government lawyers 
with one another.143  More importantly, they used state power to articulate, 
develop, and attempt to entrench a more enduring conservative vision of 
law and politics, both inside and outside the state.144 
Attorney General Edwin Meese III and his colleagues brought to the DOJ 
significant organizational innovations aimed at long-term change in line 
with conservative movement ideas.  The DOJ engaged in strategic planning, 
focusing on goals oriented toward future administrations, and devoted 
resources to the emergence and development of broader conservative legal 
and constitutional theories.145  Meese chose Stephen Markman, who 
founded the D.C. chapter of the Federalist Society, to lead the Office of 
Legal Policy (OLP).  Markman in turn ran the department like a social 
movement organization, focusing on coordinating government efforts to 
achieve “‘a consistent conservative voice in [government] litigation.’”146  
Indeed, Meese described OLP as “‘an in-house think tank.’”147  With 
Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation, OLP lawyers charted a clear course 
for government litigation aimed at influencing constitutional construction 
 
 139. Feldblum, for instance, recounts how Professor Paul Miller, an important disability 
rights advocate who also served as an EEOC Commissioner, aided her rise to the EEOC 
through his work in President Obama’s presidential appointments office. See Chai R. 
Feldblum, Following in Paul Miller’s (Very Large) Footsteps, 86 WASH. L. REV. 702, 702 
(2011). 
 140. See Teles, supra note 73, at 62. 
 141. See id. at 63. 
 142. See id. at 62–63. 
 143. See id. at 71–72. 
 144. See id. at 75–78. 
 145. See id. at 67. 
 146. See id. at 68 (quoting Kenneth Cribb). 
 147. See id. at 69 (quoting Edwin Meese III); see also id. at 81. 
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on issues important to conservative movement groups.148  And with The 
Constitution in the Year 2000:  Choices Ahead in Constitutional 
Interpretation, government lawyers communicated that vision and path both 
to movement leaders outside the state and to ground-level constituents.149  
DOJ leaders articulated a conservative new direction for government 
litigation and laid the groundwork for both legal and political mobilization 
around a conservative ideology that would touch on a number of issues to 
which movement conservatives had dedicated themselves.  Moreover, by 
working to populate the federal bench with movement conservatives, 
executive branch lawyers ensured that the courts would be receptive to their 
new vision.150  Ultimately, conservative movement lawyers in the DOJ 
actively shaped both the government’s agenda and the broader legal 
environment to align government power with conservative ideals for years 
to come.151 
C.  Harnessing State Power to Advance Shared Movement-State Goals 
Lawyers in public enforcement positions are uniquely situated not simply 
to shape the agency in which they serve but also to undertake work that 
more directly interacts with the social movement’s substantive agenda.152  
 
 148. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, GUIDELINES ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (Feb. 19, 1988) (covering constitutional interpretation, 
standing, limits on federal power, individual liberties, and statutory interpretation).  Even as 
the Guidelines invited outside engagement, they explained that they were “promulgated 
solely for the purpose of facilitating internal deliberations within the Executive Branch 
itself.” Id. at iii. 
 149. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL:  THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000:  CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (Oct. 11, 1988); Siegel, supra note 105, at 221; Teles, supra note 73, at 81.  
For Attorney General Meese’s views on the role of nonjudicial branches in constitutional 
construction, see Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987). 
 150. See TELES, supra note 20, at 157–59; Siegel, supra note 105, at 216–17; cf. Sheldon 
Goldman et al., W. Bush Remaking the Judiciary:  Like Father Like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 
282, 284–85 (2003); Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on 
Congressional Power:  Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 
367 (2003). 
 151. While Teles’s study of conservative movement lawyers shows a carefully 
orchestrated and comprehensive effort by government lawyers to shape the state in a 
direction favorable to the movement, government lawyers in other contexts may influence 
the state’s agenda in more limited—and less ideological—ways.  Executive branch lawyers, 
especially those in public enforcement positions, inhabit positions that furnish access to 
government agenda setting and provide publicity and credibility to the issues and strategies 
they push. See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
434, 437 (2007); see also GUINIER, supra note 16, at 32. 
 152. Given barriers to private enforcement, public enforcement may be especially 
important.  As Professors Catherine Albiston and Laura Beth Nielsen argue, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of 
Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), disincentivized private civil rights 
litigation by encouraging strategic capitulation by government defendants. See Catherine R. 
Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:  The Empirical 
Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087 (2007).  
The effects of Buckhannon, they claim, “herald a shift from private rights enforcement 
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By taking steps that advance the movement’s substantive priorities and by 
using their governmental positions to press state action favorable to the 
movement, cause lawyers inside the state may play a significant and often 
public role in advancing the cause with which they identify.153  Put another 
way, these lawyers occupy law-making institutions in ways that allow them 
to create a favorable legal environment, constructing a doctrinal and 
regulatory framework that supports the movement.154 
In this context, attention focuses on movement actors occupying 
positions dedicated to issues important to the movement.  Accordingly, 
cause lawyering experience is especially relevant to the individual’s ability 
to gain the government position.  Previous advocacy work serves as a 
qualification for the government enforcement role.155  Yet, while movement 
advocates enter the government based on their expertise springing largely 
from movement work, these government lawyers are generally not 
understood as cause lawyering inside the state.  Instead, they are seen as 
implementing governmental policy in their area of expertise.  Unlike in the 
context of government reform, where in some cases activists dispersed 
throughout the federal bureaucracy can impact policy inside the 
government, here government employees are specifically occupying 
positions charged with influencing issues that relate to the movement.  In 
this sense, while they use state power to move the cause forward, they do so 
from positions that align the government with the cause.  In other words, 
the government and the movement have an overlapping agenda, and the 
government lawyer may now use state power to push shared goals. 
 
toward more government power both to resist rights mandates and to control the 
enforcement—and ultimately the meaning—of civil rights.” Id. at 6. 
 153. Banaszak explains that some feminist activists inside the state worked in agencies 
geared towards women’s policy issues, thereby “allow[ing] them to engage in feminist 
activity as government employees.” See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 59. 
 154. This resonates with Professor Marc Galanter’s foundational work on how “the 
‘haves’ come out ahead.” See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124–25 (1974).  By 
constructing a system of rules and principles that advance the movement’s goals, 
government lawyers may create a regime that favors the movement’s long-term interests. See 
id. 
 155. Work on international feminist legal organizing—and specifically what Professors 
Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and Chantal Thomas have labeled 
“governance feminism”—explores the process by which feminism becomes an “expertise.” 
Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, 
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking:  Four Studies in Contemporary Governance 
Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 345 (2006).  They explain that governance 
feminism has “worked hard to get its people hired by governments where they participate in 
the bureaucracy of power.” Id.  They note, for instance, that “[s]pecial advisors on gender-
related violence constitute one strategy” and that “international feminist activism has been 
recognized as a qualification for sitting on the bench in the [International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia].” Id.; see also Kelly D. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender 
Crimes in International Courts and Tribunals:  1993 to 2003, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 18 
(2004) (explaining how the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that a trial judge’s “expertise in 
women’s issues and gender crimes made her exceptionally qualified,” rather than unfairly 
biased, “to sit as a judge on cases adjudicating sexual violence”). 
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Work by antidiscrimination scholars on public enforcement is instructive.  
Professor Michael Waterstone argues for greater federal enforcement of 
existing statutory antidiscrimination law and, in doing so, sees a significant 
role for cause lawyering activity inside the state.156  By acknowledging that 
the opportunities for effective enforcement change with a new 
administration, Waterstone’s account suggests that a new set of political 
actors brings with it new lawyers with different priorities.157  And in times 
of more liberal administrations, cause lawyers from traditional civil rights 
organizations may be called on to carry out the government’s enforcement 
efforts.158  Waterstone urges these lawyers to more aggressively pursue 
their enforcement obligations.  Yet, by dealing primarily with government 
lawyers authorized to initiate litigation in the public interest under existing 
statutory schemes,159 his account conceptualizes government lawyers more 
as experts implementing public policy than as advocates moving forward a 
social movement’s agenda.  Accordingly, because these lawyers occupy 
positions charged with public enforcement, they may carry out their duties, 
which may coincide with movement priorities, without compromising their 
own professional legitimacy or the legitimacy of the government agency in 
which they work. 
Of course, Waterstone acknowledges that even though these government 
lawyers are enforcing existing laws, they may use a variety of tools and 
resources to broaden implementation and enforcement.160  Indeed, he urges 
them to do just that.161  Clearly, the experience these new government 
actors gained through their cause lawyering work impacts the forcefulness 
and creativity with which they carry out their public enforcement duties.  In 
considering these duties, it is useful to distinguish government actors’ 
distinct roles in regulation, litigation, and adjudication. 
 
 156. See Waterstone, supra note 151. 
 157. See id. at 436 (“[E]xisting academic accounts tend to treat public enforcement as 
chronically ineffective and incapable of improvement.  In the current political environment, 
it may seem naïve or overly ambitious to talk about a more systemic and effective role for 
public enforcement authorities.  But administrations do not last forever, and when the 
pendulum swings back in a more pro-civil rights direction, it is important to have models of 
more proactive public enforcement behavior.”) (footnote omitted).  Even when criticizing 
the power of public enforcement, antidiscrimination scholars recognize the political 
contingency of legal action by the government.  For instance, Professor Michael Selmi 
observes some changes in enforcement patterns when a new administration from a different 
political party takes power. See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil 
Rights:  The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1422–23 (1998).  
Yet Selmi also shows that the EEOC did not enforce civil rights laws, as a general matter, 
under the Clinton Administration with any greater vigor than it did under earlier Republican 
administrations. See id. at 1430. 
 158. See Stein et al., supra note 8, at 1697.  Indeed, Professor Guinier, who had worked at 
LDF, describes the way in which her civil rights colleagues supported her nomination to 
serve as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. See GUINIER, supra note 16, at 32. 
 159. See Selmi, supra note 157, at 461. 
 160. See Stein et al., supra note 8, at 1697–1702. 
 161. See Waterstone, supra note 151, at 437. 
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1.  Regulation 
First, government lawyers may develop and promulgate regulations 
governing statutes.162  In this role, they can shape legal implementation and 
influence doctrinal developments over the long run.163  And they can do so 
without official judicial or legislative changes.  Even during more hostile 
administrations, this regulatory function may allow some lawyers to 
preserve earlier movement gains.  On one hand, government lawyers can 
alert movement activists to proposed regulatory changes that might 
otherwise escape notice.164  On the other hand, the very technical and 
burdensome nature of regulatory governance may insulate sympathetic 
lawyers’ work from careful scrutiny by high-level officials and political 
activists.165 
Lawyers who served as legislative advocates or lobbyists may play a 
particularly significant role in this more regulatory capacity.166  Their prior 
experience may have produced dexterity with the relevant legislation and 
familiarity with the legislative history, both of which may inform their work 
inside the government.  More generally, government lawyers who served in 
legislative roles may possess greater expertise on the day-to-day operation 
of agencies and the relationship of the federal bureaucracy to the political 
process.  In other words, former legislative cause lawyers may enjoy a 
smooth transition into government practice and may find regulatory work 
especially well-suited to their skill sets.167 
In more forceful regulatory efforts, government lawyers can shape the 
development of novel theories of discrimination.  Professors Nicholas 
Pedriana and Robin Stryker show how, in its early years, the EEOC pushed 
 
 162. In a related vein, Professor Charles Epp shows at the local bureaucratic level that 
“[t]he interaction between . . . activist pressure from the outside and reform ideas from the 
inside . . . generated enormous pressure for reform.” CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL:  
ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 3–4 (2009).  The 
system of “legalized accountability” that Epp identifies is most meaningful “where agencies 
are closely connected to professional networks.” Id. at 4. 
 163. Bagenstos, for instance, promulgated the 2010 Americans with Disabilities Act 
regulations. See Samuel Bagenstos, supra note 7.  And the EEOC, where Feldblum serves, 
issued regulations implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. See Regulations to 
Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 76 
Fed. Reg. 58 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).  For a historical analysis 
revealing how regulatory determinations shape the content of civil rights laws, see Cary 
Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1307 (2012). 
 164. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 146–47, 177–78. 
 165. See id. at 180–81. 
 166. Cause lawyering scholarship more generally would benefit from greater attention to 
lawyers in regulatory and legislative roles. 
 167. They may also move into explicitly legislative roles. Cf. Robert A. Katzmann & 
Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for “Statutory Housekeeping”:  Appellate Courts 
Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 131, 139–40 (2007). 
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more expansive interpretations of Title VII.168  Even when faced with 
doctrinal constraints and pressure from employers, the EEOC worked with 
civil rights advocates to “target institutionalized seniority and testing 
practices” and ultimately to “expand[] the concept of discrimination to 
prohibit not just discriminatory intent, but also discriminatory consequences 
of institutionalized employment practices.”169  In fact, the agency used its 
limited internal capacities to conduct its own studies and eventually issue 
guidelines on employment testing that solidified the agency’s broad 
interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination.170  While 
Pedriana and Stryker do not focus on movement actors at the EEOC—
instead showing that EEOC officials during the agency’s early years were 
pressured by cause lawyers outside the government—other scholars have 
shown how feminist attorneys working at the EEOC pressed the concept of 
systemic discrimination.171  These insiders used existing legal norms to 
push more capacious understandings of sex discrimination.172 
Government lawyers may also use their regulatory authority to develop 
more creative approaches to civil rights enforcement.  Indeed, with the 
neoliberal turn of the state, state actors may increasingly fill more 
collaborative, and less authoritative, roles in relation to regulated entities.173  
Waterstone, for instance, advocates New Governance solutions in which 
government lawyers work more collaboratively with regulated parties to 
ensure ADA compliance.174  He cites the DOJ’s Project Civic Access, in 
which DOJ officials conduct compliance reviews of state and local 
governments, as an example of flexible regulatory enforcement.175  
Ultimately, he proposes more capacious efforts that seek to harness the 
federal government’s authority in disability rights domains characterized by 
 
 168. See Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, The Strength of a Weak Agency:  
Enforcement of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Expansion of State Capacity, 
1965–1971, 110 AM. J. SOC. 709 (2004). 
 169. Id. at 727. 
 170. See id. at 734.  Pedriana and Stryker do not characterize EEOC lawyers as cause 
lawyers, instead showing that in the early years of the agency’s existence, the EEOC felt 
pressure to “legitimate its existence,” which it could do through accepting and pushing civil 
rights groups’ broad doctrinal positions. See id. at 748. 
 171. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 145.  Movement activists in government, including 
at the EEOC, also were vital to the development of comparable worth policies. See MICHAEL 
W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK:  PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION 129–30 (1994); Santoro & McGuire, supra note 83, at 511. 
 172. More recently, as discussed above, government actors have included gender identity 
as a prohibited ground of discrimination in federal employment, and, in doing so, have 
pressed a transgender-inclusive concept of sex discrimination. See GUIDANCE REGARDING 
THE EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS, supra note 122. 
 173. On the relationship among New Governance, neoliberalism, and legal liberalism, see 
Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism:  Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules, Organization 
and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357.  On lawyers’ roles in these regimes, see NeJaime, supra 
note 43, at 338; see also Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance:  Interests, 
Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503, 546 (2008). 
 174. See Waterstone, supra note 151, at 488–96. 
 175. See id. at 490. 
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underenforcement of fairly generalized norms.176  Through this lens, DOJ 
lawyers are not litigators but facilitators.177 
2.  Litigation 
Next, in more traditional litigation efforts, government lawyers can stake 
out a strong role in civil rights enforcement, both through the level of 
enforcement and the articulation of specific legal theories.  With power to 
initiate litigation and with resources for more large-scale suits, government 
lawyers may develop types of cases they may not have had the capacity or 
latitude to pursue in other practice settings.  They may also use the 
government’s resources and enforcement powers to point law and policy in 
new directions.178  Therefore, the presence of cause lawyers in positions 
with litigation authority may combine with the government’s vast 
capabilities to produce an especially powerful resource. 
Waterstone argues that, in the disability context, government lawyers 
should bring “structural litigation”—“large systemic cases”—in the areas of 
failure-to-hire and physical accessibility.179  The government, he suggests, 
is well-suited to pursue this large-scale litigation.180  Indeed, Bagenstos’s 
appointment to the DOJ gave Waterstone and his colleagues hope for 
increased ADA enforcement.181  Bagenstos, in turn, focused on 
enforcement regarding both public accessibility182 and integrated 
placements for individuals with disabilities.183  In his powerful government 
position, his decisions on how to prioritize the Civil Rights Division’s 
enforcement capacities shaped the effectiveness of disability rights laws. 
While government lawyers may step up enforcement of established 
statutory rights, they may also press more expansive definitions of rights so 
as to protect groups otherwise left with uncertain coverage.  For instance, 
after LGBT rights lawyers filed suit against the Anoka-Hennepin School 
District in Minnesota on behalf of LGBT students subject to harassment, 
 
 176. See id. at 491–92. 
 177. See id. at 493. 
 178. See GUINIER, supra note 16, at 34 (“I accepted the nomination with a dual sense of 
mission.  I believed it was critical to enforce existing laws.  I also wanted to change direction 
in the fight for civil rights.  I was not sanguine about simply recommitting the federal 
government and its resources to enforcing a 1960s vision of formal equality.  I believed that 
innovative remedies were needed to address a different, more complex set of problems.”). 
 179. See Waterstone, supra note 151, at 436–37. 
 180. See id. at 461. 
 181. See Stein et al., supra note 8, at 1697. 
 182. Deputy A.G. for Civil Rights, on Enforcing the Promise of the ADA, and Beyond, 
HARV. L. SCH. (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2009/09/14_civil_rights.
html (quoting Bagenstos:  “One of the priorities in the civil rights division of the Justice 
Department is enforcing the rights of access to public places close to home, and in the 
world—such as stores and restaurants.”). 
 183. See Samuel Bagenstos, supra note 7.  This enforcement effort draws on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), upholding a decision finding that 
the failure to discharge institutionalized individuals into integrated, community-based 
settings constituted discrimination under the ADA. 
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the DOJ filed its own complaint against the school, thereby staking out an 
important enforcement role for the federal government.184  Strikingly, DOJ 
attorneys argued that the “students . . . experienced and reported verbal and 
physical sex-based harassment because of their gender nonconformity.”185  
By conceptualizing harassment against LGBT students, including the use of 
antigay epithets, as harassment based on gender nonconformity, 
government attorneys pushed a definition of statutory and constitutional 
gender-nondiscrimination norms that included sexual orientation and 
gender identity.186  In doing so against a legal backdrop hostile—especially 
outside the educational context—to the use of sex-discrimination norms to 
frame sexual-orientation-based claims, DOJ attorneys provided important 
credibility to the interpretations advanced by LGBT rights lawyers.187  In 
the end, the DOJ’s enforcement action may influence the development of 
the law in this area and possibly bleed outside the educational context. 
3.  Adjudication 
Finally, lawyers who enter government service may also serve 
enforcement roles with adjudicative responsibilities.188  While this suggests 
the importance of attention to the movement of cause lawyers into judicial 
positions, here I am addressing only those lawyers in executive branch 
positions with some adjudicative duties.189  When acting in this capacity, 
concerns about legitimacy are especially pronounced.  As neutral decision 
makers without agendas influenced either by social movements or political 
leaders, government lawyers exercising adjudicative powers are perhaps 
most constrained in their ability to push movement priorities.  Therefore, it 
is important to attend to the background conditions that may allow 
 
 184. See Chris Geidner, DOJ Files Civil Rights Lawsuit Against MN School District; 
Settlement Proposal with DOJ, Students Follow, METROWEEKLY (Mar. 5, 2012, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/03/doj-files-civil-rights-lawsuit.html. 
 185. Complaint-in-Intervention at 20, Doe v. Anoka-Hennepin School District No. 11, 
No. 11-cv-01999 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/
documents/anokacompint.pdf. 
 186. See, e.g., id. at 6–7. 
 187. Schools constitute one of the rare domains in which courts have favorably treated 
sex discrimination claims by lesbian and gay plaintiffs. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 
F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).  In the contexts of Title VII and constitutional equality, courts 
historically have been much more hostile to these claims. See, e.g., Anderson v. Napolitano, 
No. 09-60744-CIV, 2010 WL 431898 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2010); Trigg v. N.Y. City Transit 
Auth., No. 99-CV-4730, 2001 WL 868336 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 26, 2001); Deborah A. Widiss, 
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex 
Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 495 (2007) (analyzing the failure of 
sex discrimination claims in same-sex marriage cases). 
 188. Looking outside actual adjudication, Luban argues in his critique of OLC lawyers 
during the Bush Administration that executive branch lawyers’ opinions “binding entire 
departments of the government” are “quasi-judicial.” DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS & 
HUMAN DIGNITY 203 (2007). 
 189. For a discussion of the relationship between social movements and judges, see 
Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 731–33 (2012). 
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government officials to make crucial decisions favorable to a cause in their 
adjudicative roles. 
In Macy, a case brought by lawyers at the Transgender Law Center 
(TLC), the EEOC recently ruled that Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination protects employees discriminated against based on their 
transgender status.190  While the EEOC includes Feldblum, an experienced 
LGBT advocate and scholar whose confirmation social conservatives 
attempted to block, the timing and framing of the EEOC’s decision shields 
the agency, at least to some extent, from attacks on its neutrality and allows 
it to maintain its legitimacy.  First, the EEOC acted as a unified, bipartisan 
body, issuing a unanimous ruling; Feldblum, the only commissioner with 
significant LGBT rights experience, was merely one of the commissioners 
who reached the decision. 
Next, and more importantly, the EEOC intervened at a moment when the 
law surrounding coverage of transgender employees under Title VII—and 
antidiscrimination law more generally—had developed significantly.  A 
growing body of federal case law supported the EEOC’s conclusion and 
thereby allowed the EEOC to frame its ruling not as an expansion of rights 
but as an affirmation of existing judicial constructions.  Not only have those 
circuit courts seen as more liberal issued sex discrimination decisions in 
favor of transgender litigants,191 but traditionally more conservative circuit 
courts also have made sweeping pronouncements that include transgender 
employees under the rubric of sex discrimination.  The EEOC quoted at 
length from the Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Glenn v. Brumby192 
and the Sixth Circuit’s landmark decision in Smith v. City of Salem.193  By 
relying on a growing body of federal case law, the EEOC’s decision built 
on the accomplishments of movement lawyers who litigated some of these 
cases in the federal courts.  The EEOC also rooted its reasoning in the 
Supreme Court’s foundational decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,194 
holding that discrimination based on failure to conform to sex stereotypes 
violates Title VII.195  Indeed, the EEOC explained how the federal court 
decisions in favor of transgender employees grew out of Price 
Waterhouse.196  In addition to a growing body of federal case law, the 
EEOC could look to its own internal guidance and other recent guidance 
 
 190. See Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt. 
 191. See id. at 8–9 (citing decisions from the First and Ninth Circuits). 
 192. See id. at 10 (quoting Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying 
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional principles governing sex discrimination)).  It is worth 
noting that the Eleventh Circuit decision was written by Judge Rosemary Barkett, who has 
demonstrated a commitment to LGBT equality. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1290–1313 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 193. See Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, at 9 (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying Title VII sex discrimination principles)). 
 194. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 195. See Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, at 7. 
 196. See id. at 8. 
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within the federal government to support its reasoning.  That is, the internal 
developments identified in Part III.A laid the groundwork for the EEOC to 
issue a broad ruling on the coverage of transgender employees under Title 
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination. 
All of these earlier developments, both within the federal bureaucracy 
and in the federal courts, allowed the EEOC to explain that its decision 
“clarifie[d],” rather than newly announced, “that claims of discrimination 
based on transgender status . . . are cognizable under Title VII’s sex 
discrimination prohibition.”197  Indeed, NCTE’s Keisling described the 
EEOC decision as “an inevitable step touched off by” earlier federal court 
decisions.198 
Even though the EEOC situated its decision as a clarification and an 
affirmation of the majority position in the federal courts, its decision is 
highly significant and will have an important impact inside the government, 
in the government’s relationships with private actors, and in private 
workplaces.  LGBT rights advocates have hailed the EEOC’s ruling as “a 
real sea change.”199  TLC’s Masen Davis celebrated the decision as a “big 
leap forward” and a “game-changer,” explaining that it “creates a whole 
new fabric of legal support for our community.”200  The decision governs 
other federal agencies and departments,201 and Williams Institute 
researchers have suggested that the EEOC’s reasoning will be extended to 
federal contractors.202  More importantly, since the EEOC’s decision 
applies to the agency’s general enforcement and litigation work,203 Davis 
noted that “transgender people can [now] bring claims at EEOC offices 
across the country.”204  In fact, Davis advised constituents, “If you think 
you are being targeted with harassment or discrimination at work, I urge 
you to contact your local EEOC office and file a complaint.”205  Moreover, 
 
 197. Id. at 5–6. 
 198. See Chris Geidner, DOJ Accepts EEOC Ruling that Trans Bias is Covered by Title 
VII, ATF Begins Investigation, METROWEEKLY (May 21, 2012, 11:55 PM), http://
www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/05/the-department-of-justice-has.html. 
 199. See Chris Geidner, Transgender Breakthrough, METROWEEKLY (Apr. 23, 2012, 
10:38 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/news/?ak=7288 (quoting Shannon Minter of the 
National Center for Lesbian Rights). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See About EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (explaining that the “EEOC 
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Programs, an agency within the Department of Labor, interprets the executive order 
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 203. See Geidner, supra note 199. 
 204. Id.; see also Enforcement, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (explaining the 
EEOC’s private sector enforcement program). 
 205. See Geidner, supra note 198. 
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Berrien, the EEOC Chair, noted that in the wake of Macy, the agency 
“provided legal training on the treatment of various forms of discrimination 
against LGBT persons under the sex discrimination prohibition of Title 
VII” and “provided cultural competency training to enforcement personnel 
across the country.”206  Not only will EEOC investigators accept claims by 
transgender employees, but the EEOC can also use its litigation capacities 
to pursue claims against discriminatory employers.207  Courts, in turn, may 
give weight to the EEOC’s interpretation.208  Perhaps most importantly, the 
EEOC’s decision may affect private workplace norms even without 
litigation; lawyers will advise employers on the EEOC’s interpretation, and 
those employers may internalize the norm of nondiscrimination.209 
Even when dealing with far-reaching government enforcement, in which 
government actors in regulatory, litigation, and adjudicative roles use state 
power in service of movement goals, it is important to note the extent to 
which such activity relies on existing laws, draws on statutory authority, 
and emerges from dedicated government locations.  Bagenstos, for instance, 
worked in an agency with a disability section and was charged with 
enforcing an omnibus federal statute prohibiting discrimination.210  Indeed, 
Waterstone makes clear that he is “advocating that public enforcement 
agencies perform the role that they are already tasked with more 
effectively.”211  Accordingly, the existence of statutory frameworks and 
dedicated roles and agencies significantly impacts the availability and 
viability of opportunities to advance movement priorities from inside the 
state and, to some extent, mediates the legitimacy and neutrality concerns 
implicated by cause lawyer movement into the state.212  These government 
lawyers use state power to advance goals that the movement and the state 
are understood to share. 
 
 206. June 18 Berrien Letter, supra note 134. 
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 211. Waterstone, supra note 151, at 452 (emphasis added). 
 212. Like Waterstone’s, other arguments in favor of increased public enforcement 
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enforcement of Title VI). 
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Government actors enjoy considerably less leeway to pursue more 
confrontational activism from within the state and to stake out movement 
positions in the absence of an existing statutory framework or dedicated 
agency.  Nonetheless, in more limited circumstances, government lawyers 
may push an agenda that, instead of merely enforcing existing rights (even 
if broadly construed), seeks to recognize and secure new rights.  For 
instance, DOJ lawyers’ refusal to defend the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act213 (DOMA) constitutes a bold step in favor of federal rights for same-
sex couples in direct contravention of a federal statute withholding such 
rights.  This example is less a story of public enforcement and more a story 
of movement-state interactions producing a realignment of government 
policy to match more closely movement positions.  In the next section, I 
turn to this more complicated and nuanced movement-state intersection. 
D.  Facilitating and Mediating Movement-State Relationships 
Cause lawyers who move into the state may facilitate and shape 
relationships between the movement, including cause lawyers outside the 
state, and the government, including allies and potential allies.214  This 
intermediary role implies interactions both with those outside the state and 
with new colleagues in the government.  On one hand, cause lawyers who 
move into government positions continue to interact with their movement 
colleagues, providing information that may inform movement goals and 
tactics.  On the other hand, through internal government interactions, they 
furnish expertise and knowledge to government officials and create and 
seize on opportunities in the government.215  By doing so, they may 
advance movement goals from inside the state and push the government 
toward official positions more favorable to the movement.  This function is 
more subtle than the enforcement role,216 which relies on the public 
dimensions of action by cause lawyers who have moved into government 
positions.217 
 
 213. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 214. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 102 (“[I]nsider feminists helped to connect 
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helpful with feminist causes.”). 
 215. See id. at 102 (“[I]nsider feminist activists were well placed to build connections the 
women’s movement needed to mobilize and to affect government policy.”). 
 216. Indeed, Banaszak goes further, addressing feminist activism inside the state that 
operated “under the radar.” See id. at 20 (“Movement activists in the federal bureaucracy 
often operated ‘under the radar’—in ways that never attracted the attention of their 
supervisors, the media, or opponents and occasionally even went unnoticed by other 
feminists—but their actions did alter public policy in ways that aided movement goals.”). 
 217. See Waterstone, supra note 151, at 436 (explaining that government action sends a 
message); see also Feldblum, supra note 139, at 702 (describing Paul Miller’s work at the 
EEOC as “very public”). 
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1.  Turning Outward 
First, cause lawyers inside the state may quite literally facilitate 
movement-state interactions by providing a forum in which movement 
actors and government officials can discuss and consider issues of 
importance to the movement.  For instance, the EEOC sponsored a “brown 
bag session on transgender issues in the workplace” that featured movement 
activists outside the state, state actors, and movement lawyers who had 
moved into the government.218  Keisling, the executive director of NCTE, 
and Lisa Mottet, a lawyer at the Transgender Civil Rights Project of the 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, spoke along with Louis Lopez, the 
Deputy Chief of the Employment Litigation Section of the DOJ’s Civil 
Rights Division, and Sharon McGowan, a former litigator with the ACLU’s 
LGBT Rights Project who had moved into the appellate section of the 
DOJ’s Civil Rights Division.219  At the ACLU, McGowan had successfully 
litigated a landmark transgender rights case under Title VII,220 and she has 
written about transgender rights litigation.221 
Next, cause lawyers inside the state may regularly communicate with 
movement actors outside the state and in doing so may, both intentionally 
and unintentionally, share information.222  Chai Feldblum’s social media 
work provides an important illustration.  In her role as commissioner, 
Feldblum maintains a public Facebook page and Twitter feed from which 
she communicates information about EEOC work and provides her own 
thoughts on more general antidiscrimination efforts and issues.223  Not only 
does this send an important message of public enforcement that resonates 
with the discussion in the previous section, but it also provides a link 
between Feldblum as an EEOC Commissioner and her colleagues, who 
benefit from her flagging of EEOC developments.  Feldblum’s followers 
not only receive concrete information, but they gain from her thoughts on 
those developments.224 
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worked as a legislative advocate and expert. 
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Cause lawyers inside the state may filter information through their own 
movement lens and provide insights based on their government 
experience.225  For movement advocates outside the state, this may signal 
the government’s openness to particular movement goals.  For instance, 
Paul Miller wrote important scholarly accounts of ADA enforcement while 
serving on the EEOC, drawing on his experiences to respond to critiques of 
the ADA and create a compelling case for strong public enforcement.226  
His contributions aided the work of other disability advocates and signaled 
the EEOC’s commitment to antidiscrimination enforcement. 
To be clear, none of this is to suggest that cause lawyers inside the state 
are serving a covert movement role or are funneling government 
information to movement actors.227  Rather, it is to say that because of their 
ties to movement actors, they likely will continue to interact with the 
movement and circulate information to movement activists outside the 
state.  By doing so, they communicate information and impressions about 
the relationship of the state to the movement.228 
Finally, movement actors outside the state may provide opportunities for 
movement-state interactions.  Movement-sponsored conferences and events 
may draw actors in government to the external movement community.229  
These interactions offer important moments of information sharing and 
thought development, send signals of support from the Administration, and 
likely provide insights with which movement actors outside the state can 
develop strategy.230  In some instances, cause lawyers inside the state may 
essentially represent the Administration when they speak at movement 
events, thereby strengthening ties between the state and the movement and 
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signaling the Administration’s openness to the movement’s advocacy.231  
For example, both Feldblum and Attorney General Eric Holder spoke at the 
2012 Lavender Law Conference, the National LGBT Bar Association’s 
annual conference, which attracts lawyers from across the LGBT rights 
movement.  Feldblum, along with DOJ attorney McGowan and other 
government lawyers, participated on a panel titled, “LGBT Issues in 
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:  An Inside Perspective from EEOC and 
DOJ Attorneys.”232  Holder delivered the conference’s keynote address, 
declaring that “at every level of the Obama Administration, [LGBT rights] 
work has long been a top priority—and . . . has resulted in meaningful, 
measurable, and enduring change.”233 
Government lawyers’ relationships with movement organizations may 
raise those organizations’ stature and increase their influence.  For instance, 
conservative movement lawyers inside the federal government drew 
attention to conservative organizations, most notably the Federalist Society, 
by giving speeches at their events.234  Attorney General Meese gave his 
landmark speech on originalism to the Federalist Society’s D.C. chapter, 
thereby generating useful publicity for the organization.235  In other words, 
movement lawyers who have assumed prominent government positions 
may strengthen the external movement infrastructure by drawing both 
mainstream and movement attention to select organizations. 
Movement organizations, in turn, may facilitate the organization and 
coordination of government lawyers spread across the federal bureaucracy.  
This networking effect is an important way in which cause lawyers who 
have moved into the state can more effectively advance movement ideas 
and priorities.  As Teles explains in his account of the conservative legal 
movement, the Federalist Society’s D.C. chapter, itself started by a lawyer 
in the federal government, became a mechanism for connecting 
conservative lawyers operating across the executive branch, often simply by 
holding meetings, organizing events, and hosting lunches.236  In this sense, 
the Federalist Society “reduced the transaction costs of governing as a 
conservative.”237  Movement conservatives had a mechanism “to identify 
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allies in other agencies, thereby facilitating the flow of information [and] 
helping ideas to germinate and spread.”238 
2.  Turning Inward 
While the preceding discussion stressed government lawyers’ 
interactions with other movement actors, cause lawyers inside the state also 
provide information and expertise to their non-movement government 
colleagues.  The presence of cause lawyers inside the state may furnish 
points of pressure within the government and provide expertise to allies and 
potential allies in government positions.  In this way, cause lawyers who 
have moved into the state may shape political opportunities in positive ways 
for cause lawyers outside the state.  The DOJ’s recent activism around 
DOMA provides a helpful context in which to consider these more subtle 
effects. 
To understand the intermediary role served by cause lawyers who move 
into the state, I highlight three important aspects of the developments 
surrounding the DOMA litigation.  First, cause lawyers outside the state, 
aware of the favorable environment inside the government, created 
opportunities to pressure the government to move toward a pro-LGBT 
position.  Second, lawyers inside the state had significant LGBT rights 
experience and expertise upon which other government officials could draw 
as they grappled with LGBT rights issues.  Third, the government’s new 
position on DOMA activated some government lawyers as cause lawyers, 
thus aligning them with the cause and encouraging them to take additional 
steps in support of the LGBT rights movement.  This final aspect resonates 
with cause lawyering scholarship that features government lawyers as new 
or event-centered cause lawyers.239  It also suggests that through these more 
subtle movement-state interactions, the movement and the government can 
develop overlapping agendas that ultimately position some government 
lawyers in a role that more closely approximates the public enforcement 
role described in Part III.C.  Once the government makes an official policy 
change that aligns the movement with the state, government lawyers 
advance movement goals in carrying out the new state policy. 
LGBT cause lawyers outside the state pressed DOMA claims in the 
context of a more sympathetic presidential administration.240  For the 
LGBT rights movement, the Obama Administration provided a more 
hospitable environment, with more sympathetic personnel, than the Bush 
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Administration.241  Circumstances were more favorable for the LGBT 
rights movement to affirmatively push an anti-DOMA campaign.242 
Cause lawyers outside the state created the opportunity to leverage the 
more favorable environment inside the state.243  After a positive district 
court opinion in Gill v. Office of Personnel Management,244 the organized 
movement’s first DOMA challenge, advocates filed two additional suits.  
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) filed suit in federal district 
court in Connecticut,245 and the ACLU filed suit in federal district court in 
New York.246  While Gill moved forward in the First Circuit, where 
precedent dictated that sexual orientation-based-classifications be subjected 
to rational-basis review,247 LGBT rights lawyers filed the new cases in the 
Second Circuit, where no such precedent existed.  Therefore, according to 
Holder, “the Administration face[d] for the first time the question of 
whether . . . a more rigorous standard . . . should apply.”248  In this way, 
movement lawyers outside the government filed the cases that would 
pressure the Administration to clarify its position on the constitutionality of 
sexual-orientation-based classifications. 
We do not at this point know the details of how the President and the 
DOJ reached the decision not to defend DOMA and to make the case for 
heightened scrutiny for sexual-orientation-based classifications.  What we 
do know is that significant discussions and negotiations occurred inside the 
government, and that up to that point the Obama Administration had been 
negotiating a fairly tense relationship with the LGBT rights movement.  
After government lawyers filed a brief defending DOMA based on 
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arguments that offended LGBT activists,249 administration officials met 
with leading movement advocates.250  The Administration removed such 
arguments in a subsequent brief and announced limited policy changes on 
other LGBT issues.251 
This episode demonstrated that the issue of DOMA defense was clearly 
on the table in the Administration, and the movement and the 
Administration were developing a relationship through which advocates 
could pressure the government on key issues.  Unlike during the Bush 
Administration, in which the LGBT rights movement was in a largely 
defensive posture vis-à-vis the federal government, the Obama 
Administration offered opportunities in which LGBT rights advocates could 
press their case and pressure the government to take substantive positions 
on key LGBT issues. 
When the DOJ announced its determination that DOMA is 
unconstitutional and accordingly that it would no longer defend the statute, 
The New York Times reported that the new position “followed weeks of 
high-level deliberations, first in the Justice Department’s Civil Division, 
and then at the White House.”252  Indeed, President Obama had explained, 
“I have a whole bunch of really smart lawyers who are looking at a whole 
range of options” to end DOMA.253  Lawyers who had worked on LGBT 
rights issues likely had discussions and participated in deliberations in 
which their LGBT movement experience and expertise provided important 
insights.254  Without speculating as to direct linkages between specific 
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lawyers and the change in DOMA policy, we can nonetheless understand 
the government’s new position as a result of a confluence of factors, 
including increasing pressure from LGBT rights lawyers outside the state, 
action by sympathetic government allies, and the use of LGBT rights 
expertise inside the state.  Government lawyers with significant LGBT 
rights experience could furnish knowledge, both doctrinal and policy-
oriented, as administration officials considered the best way to approach the 
newly filed DOMA suits. 
Crucially, though, those leading the Administration’s change in position 
on DOMA were neither former LGBT rights lawyers nor openly LGBT 
individuals.  Instead, high-profile LGBT allies, such as Holder, were the 
public face of the Administration’s new position.  The announcement of the 
decision, including statements regarding the deliberative process, focused 
exclusively on the President and the Attorney General.  Holder explained 
the President’s decision on the matter: 
After careful consideration, including a review of my recommendation, 
the President has concluded that given a number of factors, including a 
documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual 
orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.  The 
President has also concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to 
legally married same-sex couples, fails to meet that standard and is 
therefore unconstitutional.  Given that conclusion, the President has 
instructed the Department not to defend the statute in [such cases].  I 
concur in this determination.255 
Holder described a top-down process, in which the President, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, changed administration policy and 
subsequently instructed lower-level employees to carry out the policy 
change, in this case by no longer defending DOMA.256  Only recently has 
an openly gay DOJ attorney assumed a leading public role in the 
government litigation against DOMA.  Stuart Delery, who while in private 
practice had challenged the military’s discriminatory “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy on behalf of the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, 
became the head of the DOJ’s Civil Division.257  In his new role, Delery 
 
1:31 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/06/11/doj-liaison-lgbt-community-has-seat-at-
the-table/ (“Nosanchuk indicated he has had input into several Justice Department briefs 
defending [DOMA and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell] to make sure they didn’t use offensive 
language or arguments.”). 
 255. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House 
of Representatives 2 (Feb. 23, 2011) (emphasis added), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html [hereinafter Holder Letter]. 
 256. Of course, the decision by the Administration was not limited to the Second Circuit 
cases.  Holder explained that he would “instruct Department attorneys to advise courts in 
other pending DOMA litigation of the President’s and my conclusions that a heightened 
standard should apply, that Section 3 is unconstitutional under that standard and that the 
Department will cease defense of Section 3.” Id. 
 257. See Chris Geidner, With West’s Promotion, Out Gay Lawyer Delery to Take Helm of 
Justice Department’s Civil Division, METROWEEKLY (Feb. 27, 2012, 9:30 PM), http://
www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/02/with-wests-promotion-out-lawye.html. 
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argued the Administration’s position in Gill at the First Circuit.258  Oral 
argument featured a lengthy colloquy between the court and Delery but 
only a few minutes of argument by Mary Bonauto, the lead plaintiffs’ 
attorney from GLAD.259  Delery’s familiarity with LGBT rights law and his 
dedication to the issue aided both the movement and the government. 
Unlike in the public enforcement context, movement lawyers inside the 
state were not, at least early on, the face of the government’s movement-
friendly position.  Their cause lawyering experience was not publicly touted 
as neutral expertise.  It would have been substantially less likely and 
significantly more risky and costly—for both the specific lawyers and the 
government itself—for a former LGBT rights lawyer to have taken the lead 
on the initial decision not to defend an existing federal statute.260  Unlike in 
the public enforcement context, where former cause lawyers are specifically 
authorized in their government positions to enforce existing statutory rights, 
the nondefense scenario presents more complications for cause lawyers 
inside the state and for the state itself.261  In such a situation, it is more 
difficult to identify and defend shared movement-state goals.  If a former 
LGBT rights lawyer were to initiate, announce, and execute the decision, 
she would be subject to charges of wielding raw political power in favor of 
her own agenda.  And, in the eyes of some, she would threaten the 
legitimacy of the DOJ.262  Accordingly, in these types of situations, cause 
lawyers inside the state may be less likely to assume prominent, public 
roles—at least early on—and may instead serve as important sources of 
knowledge and expertise regarding both the substantive issues and the 
 
 258. See Lisa Keen, DOMA Case Heard in Federal Court, WINDY CITY TIMES 
(Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/lgbt/DOMA-case-heard-in-federal-
court/37124.html. 
 259. See id. 
 260. In fact, Nosanchuk had previously commented in the context of DOMA that “[t]he 
Department of Justice has a historic and traditional obligation to defend the laws that 
Congress passes.” Reilly, supra note 254. 
 261. Walter Dellinger, who served as Assistant Attorney General and head of OLC during 
the Clinton Administration, acknowledged the importance of the public governmental 
message communicated through lack of defense of a statute’s constitutionality.  In arguing 
that President Obama should stop defending the constitutionality of the military’s “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, while continuing to enforce the law, Dellinger claimed that such a 
move by the President would send a clear, unified message that the government does not 
support the law and would make courts more likely to defer to the government’s position. 
See Walter Dellinger, Op-Ed, How to Really End ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 2010, at A39 (“[T]he president could increase the chances that the appellate courts would 
agree with him by following a deliberate process that gives consideration to the views of the 
military leadership, some of whom have already come out against the policy.  The courts 
would be more likely to defer to such a clear, unified position.”). 
 262. For compelling arguments that the decision not to defend a federal statute, including 
DOMA, threatens to unsettle executive branch practice and further politicize legal 
interpretation, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1183 (2012). 
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tactical calculations involved in government action.263  Delery, for instance, 
only assumed a leading public role more than a year after the 
Administration had taken its anti-DOMA position.  In this sense, he simply 
carried out his new duties on behalf of the government, articulating and 
defending the DOJ’s position.  Ultimately, the willingness of government 
allies to take leadership roles in staking out and executing pro-movement 
positions is essential. 
While the Administration continues to enforce DOMA even as it no 
longer defends its constitutionality,264 the DOJ’s DOMA activity has had a 
tremendous impact on the LGBT rights movement.  The government’s new 
position opened up additional avenues for activism by cause lawyers 
outside the state and provided opportunities for the movement and the state 
to cooperate in their work against DOMA.  Lawyers at Lambda Legal 
refiled an employee-benefits case, Golinski v. Office of Personnel 
Management,265 as an explicit challenge to DOMA.266  Instead of 
defending DOMA, DOJ attorneys were now arguing against the law.  Tara 
Borelli, who handled the case for Lambda Legal, remarked on the fact that 
Tony West, Delery’s predecessor at the DOJ’s Civil Division,267 argued the 
Administration’s position in the district court.  Judge White, she noted, 
“‘thanked the DOJ for having sent the head of the civil division’ to argue 
the case himself, adding that it made ‘a statement of the significance that 
DOJ and the administration place on this question.’”268  Under an event-
centered approach, high-profile DOJ lawyers have assumed important cause 
lawyering duties from within the government.  Ultimately, the 
government’s legal position influenced the court’s decision.  In holding 
DOMA unconstitutional, Judge White agreed with the Administration’s 
 
 263. Cf. BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 25 (emphasizing the importance of “looking not 
just at the top layer of policy makers, but also at their subordinates who do not get to 
determine the general policies of a particular government”). 
 264. See Statement of the Attorney General, supra note 248, at 2. (“Section 3 of DOMA 
will continue to remain in effect unless Congress repeals it or there is a final judicial finding 
that strikes it down, and the President has informed me that the Executive Branch will 
continue to enforce the law.”).  This is not unprecedented. See Letter from Andrew Fois, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 
(Mar. 22, 1996) (detailing instances in which the DOJ has declined to defend a statute’s 
constitutionality).  The DOJ under the Clinton Administration refused to defend a statutory 
provision requiring the discharge of HIV-positive individuals from the military. See id. at 1. 
 265. 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 266. See Second Amended Complaint at 1–2, Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (No. 3:10-cv-
0257). 
 267. In February 2012, West was named Acting Associate Attorney General. See Mike 
Scarcella, Attorney General Holder Names Tony West Third in Command at DOJ, BLT: 
BLOG LEGALTIMES (Feb. 27, 2012, 4:04 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/
02/attorney-general-holder-names-tony-west-third-in-command-at-doj-.html. 
 268. Chris Geidner, Golinski Has Her Day in Court, DOJ Sends Senior Lawyer to Argue 
DOMA’s Unconstitutionality, METROWEEKLY (Dec. 16, 2011, 5:10 PM), http://metro
weekly.com/poliglot/2011/12/golinski-has-her-day-in-court.html. 
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position and relied on the DOJ’s reasoning regarding heightened 
scrutiny.269 
Furthermore, the DOJ’s policy change affected more than DOMA.  By 
articulating arguments in favor of heightened scrutiny for sexual-
orientation-based classifications, the DOJ built the foundation on which to 
challenge other antigay laws.270  Almost a year after the DOJ changed its 
position, Holder announced that the Defense and Veterans Affairs 
departments would not defend the unequal treatment of servicemembers 
with same-sex spouses.271  In his letter to House Speaker John Boehner, 
Holder relied explicitly on his earlier decision in the DOMA litigation.  He 
explained the DOJ’s view that, “like Section 3 of DOMA, 38 U.S.C. 
§ 101(3) and 38 U.S.C. § 101(31) [the relevant statutory provisions] cannot 
be constitutionally applied to same-sex couples who are legally married 
under state law.”272  The DOMA position became the basis for taking 
additional steps in favor of same-sex couples.  The earlier conclusion that 
sexual-orientation-based classifications deserve heightened scrutiny 
provided the impetus for, and reasoning in support of, the DOJ’s decision 
not to defend additional antigay laws.273 
Now, the DOJ’s stated position—that DOMA is unconstitutional—aligns 
the executive branch with the LGBT rights movement and facilitates DOJ 
activity in service of shared movement-state goals.  The movement and the 
state agendas, which only a few months earlier were opposed in significant 
ways, now overlap.  Accordingly, government lawyers use state power to 
press goals shared by the movement and the state.  Indeed, speaking to the 
National LGBT Bar Association, Holder remarked on the “shared 
commitment to advancing the cause of equality for [LGBT] individuals.”274  
 
 269. See Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (relying on the DOJ’s determination regarding 
the political powerlessness of lesbians and gay men).  The district court in Gill had ruled 
DOMA unconstitutional based merely on rational basis grounds. See Gill v. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 12-13 (U.S. 
June 29, 2012), 12-15 (U.S. July 3, 2012), and 12-97 (U.S. July 20, 2012).  On the influence 
of the Attorney General’s legal positions, see NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES:  
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 7–8 (1992) 
(explaining that courts “treat [an attorney general’s legal opinion] with deference, 
occasionally adopting the law officer’s reasoning” such that “executive interpretation may 
influence subsequent judicial interpretation of the law”). 
 270. As the executive director of the ACLU declared, the DOJ’s policy “will reach into 
issues of employment discrimination, family recognition and full equality rights for lesbian 
and gay people.” Savage & Stolberg, supra note 252. 
 271. See Chris Geidner, DOJ Won’t Defend DOMA, Other Laws Preventing Equal 
Treatment for Servicemembers With Same-Sex Spouses, METROWEEKLY (Feb. 17, 2012, 
4:11 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/02/doj-wont-defend-laws-preventin.
html. 
 272. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House 
of Representatives 2 (Feb. 17, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/boehner02-17-
12.pdf. 
 273. See id. at 1–2 (applying the heightened-scrutiny reasoning from the earlier decision 
not to defend section 3 of DOMA). 
 274. Holder Remarks, supra note 233. 
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He concluded his keynote address by noting that with movement-state 
“partnership,” lawyers both inside and outside the government will 
“continue the work that has become both our shared priority and common 
cause.”275 
Ultimately, even though cause lawyers inside the state with experience 
on LGBT rights issues did not assume strong public advocacy roles during 
the government’s deliberations and change of policy on DOMA, they likely 
provided expertise and consultation and may have facilitated discussion 
between movement representatives and government officials.  The less 
public role played by some DOJ lawyers with LGBT rights legal experience 
remains an important dimension of the movement-state overlap that 
contributed to the Administration’s work on behalf of married same-sex 
couples.  Future research, including interviews of cause lawyers who have 
worked in government positions, will be especially crucial in teasing out the 
specific dimensions of this role. 
IV.  THE LIMITATIONS OF CAUSE LAWYER MOVEMENT INTO THE STATE 
At the same time that movement-state overlap—and particularly the 
movement of cause lawyers into the state—benefits the movement by 
facilitating significant advances and making the government a more 
favorable movement force, it may also limit and constrain the movement in 
particular ways.  Some of these constraints relate to the limits of law more 
generally, which other scholars have elaborated, but in this Part I focus on 
constraints that relate to the specific dimensions of work inside the 
government.276  Social movement scholarship on movement-state overlap 
shows that while the existence of activists inside the state may provide 
important openings for movement advances,277 it also may promote 
moderate, rather than radical, movement demands and encourage 
institutional, rather than confrontational, tactics.278  By harnessing 
government power for the movement’s benefit, cause lawyer movement 
into the state may privilege goals and tactics oriented toward the state 
itself.279  In pointing to these limitations, I am drawing two related 
distinctions—one based on the nature of the cause and the other based on 
the tactics used to pursue the cause.  The movement of cause lawyers into 
 
 275. Id. 
 276. As David Luban puts it, “[w]hat happens when [a cause lawyer] decides to use the 
Ring of Power?” David Luban, The Moral Complexity of Cause Lawyers Within the State, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 705 (2012). 
 277. See Santoro & McGuire, supra note 83, at 505 (“Institutional activists are important 
in policy outcomes because of their direct access, influence, and control over government 
resources.”). 
 278. See id. at 503 (“Institutional activists . . . pursue social movement goals through 
conventional bureaucratic channels.”). 
 279. Professor William Eskridge has argued that social movement reliance on law pushes 
the movement in an assimilative direction and favors movement moderates over radicals. See 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling:  Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 423 (2001). 
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the state may correlate with reformist, rather than radical, conceptions of 
the cause, and may privilege more conventional legal tactics, such as impact 
litigation, over techniques that locate lawyers in roles subordinate to 
movement organizing.280 
Even though I am suggesting the potentially conservatizing impact of 
cause lawyer movement into the state, I do not want to overstate the extent 
to which cause lawyers in government hew to moderate movement visions 
and limit themselves to institutional tactics.281  Movement actors inside the 
state may hold a range of ideological views and movement positions.  
Indeed, the government has not been off-limits to lawyers with more radical 
views on both the left and right.282  Furthermore, government actors may 
deploy confrontational tactics—or provide information that aids 
confrontational tactics283—in service of more radical movement goals.284  
Nonetheless, by working within the existing state structure and filling 
 
 280. See Luban, supra note 276.  For examples of lawyers serving in roles that facilitate, 
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state represent only less radical feminist ideologies, or that they hold a narrow 
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BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 83. 
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Weisman, Bush Nominates Weapons Expert as Envoy to U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at 
A10.  Critics accused William Bradford Reynolds, who served as Assistant Attorney General 
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to enforce.” Kenneth R. Noble, Washington Talk:  Justice Department; Reynolds’ 
Remarkable Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1987, at A32 (quoting Senator Howard 
Metzenbaum).  And Anne Gorsuch Burford, an Environmental Protection Agency official 
during the Reagan Administration, was accused of dismantling environmental advances. See 
Douglas Martin, Anne Gorsuch Burford, 62, Reagan E.P.A. Chief, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July 
22, 2004, at C13; cf. Teles, supra note 73, at 65 (discussing the failed nomination of Robert 
Zumbrun, the founder of the Pacific Legal Foundation, to head the Legal Services 
Corporation with the goal of eliminating the agency).  More recently, as Professor Norman 
Spaulding notes, controversial Bush Administration lawyers working on issues of national 
security and executive authority “acted as moral activists or ‘cause lawyers,’ seeking to 
vindicate . . . their own strongly held moral, political, and legal views.” Norman W. 
Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1931, 1975 (2008). 
 283. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 130 (“Insider activists often saw their role as 
providing the information that was necessary to mobilize and coordinate confrontational 
tactics.”). 
 284. See id. at 188. 
 700 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
professionalized, institutional roles, cause lawyers inside the state are more 
likely, as compared to other movement activists, to pursue moderate, 
reformist goals and deploy conventional, institutional tactics.  In fact, with 
few exceptions, they are, by their mere employment, suggesting some 
degree of commitment to reforming existing institutions, rather than 
transforming the system in which those institutions reside.285  Therefore, 
this Part highlights the limiting effects that cause lawyer movement into the 
state may produce while also being attentive to the range of views—on both 
goals and tactics—held by state-based movement actors. 
A.  Goals and Tactics 
As an initial matter, the large number of legal positions in the federal 
bureaucracy makes space for cause lawyers’ entrance into the state.  This 
means that lawyers—merely one segment of a particular movement—likely 
have greater access to government positions.286  Lawyers possess the 
educational credentials, expertise, and work experience that qualify them 
for government employment.287  Accordingly, those who enter the state 
may represent a particularly privileged demographic in the broader 
movement.  Feminist activists who entered government positions, including 
political appointees and civil service employees, were less racially diverse, 
more educated, and had higher incomes than their movement peers.288  
Similarly, as attorneys, cause lawyers who enter the state are likely to be, as 
a general matter, less diverse along several dimensions, have higher levels 
of education, and have higher incomes than the movement population from 
which they emerge.  Moreover, government lawyer positions such as those 
in the DOJ are highly coveted and extremely prestigious.  They are 
generally reserved for those lawyers coming from the most elite law schools 
and legal organizations.  In fact, a study of DOJ Civil Rights Division 
hiring under the Obama Administration demonstrates that a majority of 
hires came from highly selective schools and worked at prestigious civil 
rights organizations.289  These dynamics further reduce the likelihood that 
cause lawyers inside the state are representative of the general movement 
population. 
 
 285. They could, of course, seek to enter the particular agency to completely disable it.  
On this point, see supra note 282. 
 286. See Calabresi, supra note 109, at 70 (“[A]ll Presidents must make use of the 
assistance of thousands of lawyers in the Justice Department, the White House Counsel’s 
Office, and the Cabinet Departments and agencies.”). 
 287. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 4 (“Because some women are better able to enter 
the state than others, the part of the women’s movement that intersects the state is not 
representative of the whole movement.”).  Furthermore, there are simply more lawyers who 
have worked at public interest law organizations, and these organizations now cover a wider 
range of substantive issues relevant to government policy. See Nielsen & Albiston, supra 
note 20, at 1605–08, 1615. 
 288. See BANASZAK, supra note 82, at 90–91. 
 289. See Savage, supra note 3. 
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The demographic make-up of cause lawyers entering the state has 
implications for the priorities of those lawyers once inside the government.  
Certain issues, which affect them and their peer group most significantly, 
may rise to the fore while other issues, which may figure prominently in the 
lives of more vulnerable movement members, may attract little attention.  
Banaszak, for instance, finds that feminist activists inside the state “largely 
focused on those aspects of the feminist agenda that reflected the needs of 
middle-class white women:  equal opportunity issues, rather than issues of 
poverty for example.”290  Similarly, the more recent government action on 
LGBT issues has focused on military service (repeal of the “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” policy), marriage (the decision not to defend DOMA), and 
employment discrimination (employment practices within the government 
and Title VII antidiscrimination more generally).  While these issues remain 
significant LGBT movement priorities, scholars and activists have criticized 
their prominence by arguing that they serve the most privileged LGBT 
constituents.291  Poverty, which empirical research has demonstrated is a 
major issue in LGBT communities,292 receives relatively scant attention as 
an LGBT issue. 
Nonetheless, cause lawyers inside the state may possess robust and 
inclusive movement visions and may attempt to improve the lives of more 
vulnerable movement populations.  Both Feldblum and McGowan, for 
instance, were vocal transgender rights advocates outside the state, and 
activity inside the state suggests that they maintain this commitment.  The 
federal government has pursued nondiscrimination norms for transgender 
employees, and publicly available documents indicate that Feldblum has 
played a significant role on this issue.  Yet this more inclusive agenda 
attempts to work through institutional channels to integrate vulnerable 
populations into the existing state-centered project.  In this sense, LGBT 
rights work inside the state appears more assimilative and reformist than 
transformative and radical.  Professor Dean Spade, for instance, criticizes 
prioritizing employment discrimination in transgender activism, arguing 
that even expansive employment nondiscrimination mandates “would not 
scratch the surface of trans poverty.”293  For Spade, law reform projects, of 
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 293. SPADE, supra note 291, at 83. 
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which state-centered antidiscrimination law is a part, “merely tinker[] with 
systems to make them look more inclusive while leaving their most violent 
operations intact.”294  Even without accepting the breadth of Spade’s 
critique, at a minimum we see that cause lawyers inside the state may aid 
the movement while integrating it into existing institutional 
arrangements.295 
Moving from substantive goals to tactical possibilities, when cause 
lawyers enter the state, their new institutional location dictates a more 
bounded tactical repertoire, favoring conventional legal tactics over more 
disruptive, extralegal tactics.296  Once cause lawyers enter the government, 
they may find it increasingly difficult to engage in movement work focused 
on mobilizing and organizing constituents.  When appointed to DOJ 
positions, for instance, lawyers for the most part are expected to participate 
in conventional tactics—namely litigation—rather than deploy a more 
multidimensional approach.297  Even among types of conventional legal 
tactics, certain models, such as impact litigation, fit better with the lawyers’ 
government positions than others, such as direct legal services.298  In this 
sense, operating inside the state apparatus not only constrains the character 
of the available tactics—institutional over confrontational—but also the 
specific delivery of those tactics. 
B.  Effects on the Movement 
By absorbing movement actors who deploy institutional tactics in favor 
of relatively moderate goals, the state aids those tactics and goals relative to 
their alternatives.299  In this sense, in the intra-movement contest, the 
government provides a significant push to one faction—likely the less 
transformative one—over another.  A particular vision and ideological 
orientation may prevail and gain power as specific movement 
 
 294. Id. at 91. 
 295. See WOLFSON, supra note 93, at 200.  Even with relatively moderate substantive 
issues amenable to lawyers inside the state, some lawyers may gravitate toward less 
capacious, and correspondingly less risky, cases.  That is, the lawyers’ new professional 
setting may incentivize work on cases with relatively little potential for large-scale effects. 
Cf. Scheingold, supra note 38, at 390 (explaining how proximity to the state has a 
moderating effect and forces compromises); Selmi, supra note 157, at 1441. 
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 299. See WOLFSON, supra note 93, at 201 (arguing that state-movement interpenetration 
“may discourage the use of ‘radical’ or ‘unruly’ tactics, such as protests and boycotts”). 
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representatives take up positions inside the government.300  Ultimately, 
movement work by government actors influences intra-movement conflict 
to the extent that government action may advance and entrench a particular 
brand of movement activism and ideology to the detriment of competing 
models. 
For instance, the DOJ’s important shift on DOMA and its subsequent 
litigation efforts privilege marriage as a path to LGBT equality.  Scholars 
and activists have criticized the marriage-centric push of the LGBT rights 
movement, arguing that positioning marriage as the key to relationship 
equality marginalizes nonmarital families and sacrifices a more progressive 
vision of family law reform.301  By focusing on DOMA and the rights of 
married same-sex couples and thereby increasing the salience of this issue 
and the publicity surrounding it, the government action makes less tenable 
an LGBT rights project focused on the rights of families regardless of 
marital status.302  Government support incentivizes additional movement 
activism aimed at marriage and specifically DOMA’s denial of federal 
recognition to married same-sex couples.303 
Accordingly, the exercise of state power on behalf of the movement may 
influence both substantive and tactical contests inside the movement.  
Movement organizations may be more likely to use institutional tactics in 
pursuit of moderate objectives when they have colleagues and allies in 
government.  With a favorable political environment, institutional tactics 
may hold promise, and moderate goals may become more realizable.  In a 
repressive political environment—with fewer movement actors inside the 
state—the futility of pursuing even moderate goals and using conventional 
tactics may render transformative movement visions and confrontational 
tactics less costly.304  Therefore, the existence of cause lawyers inside the 
state, during generally hospitable administrations, may channel movement 
resources toward state-centered institutional tactics aimed at substantive 
goals that the Administration likely supports or that key actors in the federal 
bureaucracy can advance.  Ultimately, while cause lawyer movement into 
government positions aids movement progress, it may circumscribe that 
progress in a way that privileges and incentivizes state-centered tactics and 
goals. 
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Nonetheless, social movements rely on a variety of tactics, and contrary 
to traditional assumptions in social movement theory, recent socio-legal 
scholarship demonstrates the productive relationship between institutional 
and confrontational tactics.305  Accordingly, direct action and protest by 
movement activists may, in some circumstances, influence and aid the 
insider tactics of government lawyers.306  While I am highlighting the 
constraints imposed by government service, future work should also 
explore the potentially productive relationship between government work 
and confrontational movement tactics. 
CONCLUSION 
By uncovering and exploring the role of cause lawyers who move inside 
the state, this Article attempts to fill a significant gap in socio-legal 
scholarship.  In doing so, it points toward a more dynamic relationship 
among cause lawyers, social movements, and the state.  Instead of using a 
one-dimensional lens that constructs cause lawyers in opposition to the state 
and sees the state as resistant, attention to cause lawyers in government 
positions suggests that social movements and the state are engaged in a 
mutually constitutive relationship.  At times, lawyers may occupy both the 
movement and the state.  The moments when they do—and their actions in 
those moments—have significant consequences for movement progress and 
impact the direction of the movement—and the state—going forward. 
Only through future empirical research that examines the incidence of 
cause lawyer movement into the state and the experiences of those lawyers 
before, during, and after government service will we build a more 
comprehensive and accurate account of cause lawyer movement in and out 
of the state.  Future research should focus not simply on the way that cause 
lawyers impact the movement and influence the government, but also the 
ways in which government service changes the lawyers themselves.  What 
compromises has the government lawyer made in her new position?  How, 
if at all, has movement into the state changed her ideological views and 
strategic calculations?  How has her government service affected her post-
government life?307  Has it limited her willingness to oppose her former 
colleagues?  Have ethical rules governing confidentiality and conflicts of 
interest prevented her from subsequently serving the cause with which she 
identifies?308  Qualitative work on cause lawyers themselves could provide 
important material with which to work through the multiple dimensions of 
these questions and many others. 
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